Marquette Law Review
Volume 105
Issue 1 Fall

Article 3

2021

Workplace Transparency Beyond Disclosure: What's Blocking the
View?
Lisa J. Bernt

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Repository Citation
Lisa J. Bernt, Workplace Transparency Beyond Disclosure: What's Blocking the View?, 105 Marq. L. Rev.
73 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol105/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

BERNT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

WORKPLACE TRANSPARENCY BEYOND
DISCLOSURE: WHAT’S BLOCKING THE
VIEW?
LISA J. BERNT*
Recent developments have exacerbated informational asymmetry between
employers and workers. Employers increasingly use “black box” automateddecision systems, such as machine learning processes where algorithms are
used in recruitment and hiring. They have technological tools that enable
intense monitoring of workers. Contemporary work relationships have
changed, with trends toward remote and scattered worksites. Employees are
more frequently bound by nondisclosure agreements, non-disparagement
provisions, and mandatory arbitration agreements. These developments have
made it more difficult for workers to communicate with each other and to act
collectively.
The result is that workers are kept in the dark when it comes to much of an
employer’s decision-making. How might an employee know, for example, if she
is being paid less than her male coworkers if she is being closely watched and
is afraid of speaking? How might someone turned down for a job know whether
the hiring process was discriminatory?
We need to look beyond disclosure mandates, take a closer look at channels
of communication in today’s workplaces, and consider the vantage point of
workers. Developing effective transparency measures requires greater
attention to the sightlines of workers who cannot get information they need to
spot, articulate, and prove violations of workplace protections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions of workplace regulation require to some extent, explicitly or
not, consideration of informational asymmetry and notions of “transparency.”
This has long been the case, but perhaps never more so than today.
Technology now allows employers to monitor workers in new and
sophisticated ways. Employers increasingly use automated decision-making
systems to hire and manage their workforces. Employees are often bound by
nondisclosure, non-disparagement, and mandatory arbitration provisions,
which can effectively silence and isolate them. Work relationships can take
many forms, ranging from the traditional on-site, 9-to-5 job, to the sporadic,
off-site schedules of gig work. Telework has become more common, making
it possible never to meet one’s coworkers.
It was already difficult for workers to see behind the curtain of many
employment practices, but these developments make that decision-making
machinery even less visible. How might an employee know, for example, if
she is being paid less than her male coworkers if she is being closely watched
and is afraid of speaking? How might someone who was denied a position
know whether the hiring process was discriminatory when machine learning
processes are used to screen job candidates?
Employees and job seekers have limited, sometimes no, access to
information they need to recognize potential workplace violations and to prove
them. To illustrate, meet Emma and Alex.
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Emma has been with the same employer, a large marketing company, for
twelve years. She is one of several non-unionized assistant managers in her
region. She suspects that she is being paid less than male assistant managers.
The company has a policy of confidentiality in its employee manual, and Emma
is afraid of talking about compensation with coworkers. She contacts a lawyer,1
who asks her some questions:
Q. What makes you think the male assistant managers are
getting paid more than you?
A. I haven’t received a raise in three years. I heard that at
least two male assistant managers got raises last year. I’ve
been there longer, and my sales numbers were better than
theirs.
Q. Do all the assistant managers have the same duties,
responsibilities, and working conditions?
A. I think so, but I’m not sure since we work in different
locations most of the time and we’re often on the road.
Q. What do you know about the salaries of the female
assistant managers?
A. I don’t know what they make.
Q. Have you heard anyone suggest that your pay might be
lower because you are a woman?
A. No.
Q. Is there some kind of policy or formula about how pay
is determined?
A. Nothing written. It seems like it is up to the regional
managers to decide how much to pay.
Q. Do you know if anyone else has complained about pay
practices at this place?
A. Not that I know of.
Alex is fifty years old and looking for a job as a software designer. He
meets the stated job requirements of the positions for which he applies. He has
checked with his references, and had his resume reviewed by a job coach. His
age and graduation dates are not on his resume, but given his work experience,
it is obvious that he is not a kid. He has checked his social media accounts to
make sure there is nothing inappropriate on them, and he has strengthened his
privacy settings. He has had no offers, and only one interview. He wonders if
he is not getting hired because of his age. He has this discussion with a lawyer:
Q. Do you know who was hired into the positions you did
not get?
1. Emma and Alex can afford at least a consultation with a law firm. See discussion infra § IV.B
about limited access to affordable counsel.
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A. No.
Q. How did you learn of these positions?
A. Online job boards, mostly ads that don’t show the
names of the employers.
Q. Did any of the postings include language suggesting a
preference for younger people?
A. No.
Q. Do you know if the employers are still looking to fill
the positions?
A. I’m not sure. There is one posting that looks like to the
one I applied to, but it’s worded a little differently. It
doesn’t identify the company, so it’s hard to tell if it’s the
same job.
Q. You did have one interview. Did anyone there say
anything to suggest your age might have been a factor?
A. No, but the interviewer looked like he was in his
twenties, and I noticed walking through the office that
almost everyone there seemed to be in their twenties or
thirties.
Q. Were you given any reason after the interview why you
did not get the job?
A. No. I just got a generic email that thanked me for
applying.
Without more information, the lawyers in these scenarios do not have much
to work with, and this might well be the end of the matters. Workers like Emma
and Alex at this point often ask: How am I supposed to know the answers to
these questions? What good are these laws if we can’t use them?
William Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat offer a useful starting
point for this discussion. They lay out three steps of a “transformation of a
perceived injurious experience into a grievance”: (1) Naming: Saying to
oneself, “I’ve been injured.” (2) Blaming: Attributing an injury to the fault of
another. (3) Claiming: Voicing a grievance and asking for a remedy.2 Factually
ignorant, Emma and Alex stand at a threshold before such naming, blaming,
and claiming are possible.
The focus of this Article is the lack of transparency at this threshold. What
information is necessary as a prerequisite to naming, blaming, and claiming?
How visible, accessible, and usable is it? It is not enough to look at disclosure
mandates. We need to take a closer look at channels of communication in

2. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635–36 (1980).
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today’s workplaces and job markets and consider the vantage point of workers.
What is their sightline? What is getting in the way?
My purpose is to flag some important obstructions to this view, with an
emphasis on the non-union shop in the private sector, where information can be
especially hard for workers to get. This requires an understanding of the
particularities of contemporary employment relationships and practices,
substantive law, and some procedural barriers.
II. LARGER DISCUSSIONS OF TRANSPARENCY
As Frederick Schauer has put it: “Transparency, it appears these days, is
everywhere; or at least talk of it is everywhere.”3
Transparency is hardly a new topic. Demands for transparency stretch back
at least to the Progressive Era, with spurts in the mid-to late-20th century when
reformers pushed for disclosures regarding product safety, environmental
pollutants, and banking practices, for example.4
Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil, in their comprehensive
treatment of transparency issues, distinguish “right-to-know” laws from
“targeted transparency policies.”5
Right-to-know measures are “open
government” laws, meant to hold officials accountable and to inform public
discourse.6
Landmark right-to-know laws include the Administrative
Procedures Act, 7 which requires federal agencies to publish notices of proposed
and final rulemaking and provide opportunities for public comment, and the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which permits the public to request access
to records from federal agencies. 8 By contrast, targeted transparency policies
require that public- and private-sector entities collect and disclose data as a
means to inform public choices.9 Examples include mandates that food
companies disclose ingredients and nutritional information in their products;
that public companies make certain financial disclosures; that banks report on
their mortgage loans to address concerns of lending discrimination; and that
schools report performance data as a condition of federal aid.10

3. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1340
(2011).
4. David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 135–39 (2018).
5. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 39 (2007).
6. Id. at 25–28.
7. 5 U.SC. § 551 et seq. (2018).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
9. FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 5, at 28.
10. Id. at 5.
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Cynthia Estlund has written extensively and pointedly on transparency in
the workplace, noting the relatively limited scholarly attention given to this
sphere until recently.11 She has proposed disclosures of various types,
including information about working conditions, job requirements,
performance standards and expectations, pay practices, safety records, leave
policies, workforce demographics, and waivers that might be required as a
condition for employment.12
Estlund writes of information disclosure along three dimensions13:
(1) Disclosure “in aid of contract”: Disclosure of information to workers
that can “help make employment contracts and labor markets more efficient as
to terms and conditions that are left to contract by better matching employee
preferences and employers’ proffered terms of employment.”14 Such would
include information to help workers decide which jobs to seek, which to accept,
whether to negotiate a better deal, and how to assess exit options.
(2) Disclosure “in aid of reputational rewards and sanctions”: Disclosure of
information to workers and the public to nudge employers beyond compliance
to “best practices” and higher standards of social responsibility.15
(3) Disclosure “in aid of compliance”: Disclosure of information to workers
and their advocates to “promote employer compliance with existing substantive
mandates by exposing evidence of noncompliance and facilitating
enforcement.” 16
The information Emma and Alex need are situated along the dimension “in
aid of compliance,” that which would allow workers to recognize violations of
law; decide whether and when to seek help; decide whether to take legal action;
and figure out how to state a claim and prove a violation. Or in Felstiner’s
framework, information needed to name, blame, and claim.17 What this means
in practice will depend on the context.
11. Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay,
4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781, 781 (2014) [hereinafter Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace
Transparency]; Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 351, 355 (2011) [hereinafter Estlund, Just the Facts] (“[T]he idea of mandatory disclosure has
made barely a cameo appearance in the field of labor and employment law.”).
12. Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency, supra note 11; Estlund, Just the
Facts, supra note 11, at 365–67.
13. Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 11, at 357. I’m discussing these out of her order.
14. Id. at 369. Of course, as Estlund notes, “workers’ ability to make use of information will
vary enormously. Workers with scarce skills and talents can use information to choose among
employers and bargain for higher wages, while workers who lack scarce skills have fewer choices and
less use for additional information about jobs and employers.” Id. at 372.
15. Id. at 369.
16. Id.
17. Felstiner, supra note 2.
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III. INFORMATION VISIBLE TO WORKERS
Employment law, which governs the relationship between an employer and
its individual employees, is a patchwork of federal, state, and local
protections.18 Hardly elegant or coherent, the field includes discrimination
laws, leave laws, wage and hour laws, safety laws, and more.19 Labor law
governs the relationship between employers and collective bargaining units.
There is some overlap of labor and employment law. For example, the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which protects the rights of employees to engage
in collective bargaining and other forms of concerted action with respect to the
terms and conditions of their employment, also applies in non-union settings in
some scenarios.20 Conversely, most individual-rights protections apply to
unionized employees. In addition to the federal and state court systems, there
are numerous federal, state, and local agencies that might investigate
complaints brought by workers, each with its own claims, processes, and
procedures.21 So perhaps it is unavoidable that discussions around transparency
in the workplace tend to be as disjointed as this web of substantive law and
procedural apparatus.
A. Disclosure Mandates
There is no unified, comprehensive scheme that requires employers to
provide information to workers. Instead, there is a hodgepodge of disclosure
requirements that might allow workers to glimpse bits of information in limited
situations.22
There are “FYI” or “heads up” disclosure requirements. The Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, for example, requires certain large
employers to provide written advance notice of covered plant closings and mass
layoffs to allow workers time to transition and seek alternative jobs or
training.23 Some state statutes require that employers notify employees about
certain types of surveillance and data-collection practices.24 (However, as
18. Craig Becker, Thoughts on the Unification of U.S. Labor and Employment Law: Is the Whole
Greater than the Sum of the Parts?, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 162 (2016).
19. Id. at 162–63, 165, 171, 186.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2018).
21. See generally Labor Laws and Issues, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/labor-laws
[https://perma.cc/YAN3-ZCU4].
22. This is not an exhaustive discussion of all disclosure mandates.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq., (2018).
24. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL.
L. REV. 735, 757–62 (2017) [hereinafter Ajunwa, Limitless Worker Surveillance] (reviewing state
statutes that address workplace monitoring); State Laws Related to Digital Privacy, NATIONAL
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discussed below, there is not much a worker can do about most of these
intrusions, except forfeit the job.)25 And in response to reports of employees
who were surprised with nonnegotiable noncompete agreements sprung on
them after starting a job, several states now require that, to be enforceable,
employers give at least some advance notice to consider post-employment
restrictions.26
Some laws allow workers the option to correct or “rebut” inaccurate
information that might affect their employability. The Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), for instance, regulates the collection, maintenance, and use of
consumers’ credit information, and access to credit reports.27 FCRA imposes
disclosure requirements on employers that conduct background checks on
workers that meet the definition of “consumer reports.”28 Before accessing a
consumer report, an employer must, inter alia, provide appropriate notice to the
worker and get written authorization for procuring such a report.29 If an
employer intends to make an adverse decision (such as rejecting a job
applicant), it first must notify the worker, provide a copy of the consumer report
relied upon and a notice of rights under FCRA, and provide an opportunity to
review the report and notify the employer of inaccuracies.30 After taking an
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 8–9, https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P6M4-CS33]
(noting state statutes that require employers to give notice to employees prior to monitoring e-mail or
internet access). Some states have recently enacted biometric privacy laws. E.g., Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act (BIPA) prohibits covered employers from obtaining biometric data, such as
fingerprints and iris scans, without notifying employees and getting consent. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
14. BIPA requires that private entities “in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information
must develop a written policy, made available to the public . . .” 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.14/15(a).
25. See discussion infra at § IV.C.3.
26. Rachel Arnow-Richman, The New Enforcement Regime: Revisiting the Law of Employee
Competition (and the Scholarship of Professor Charles Sullivan) with 2020 Vision, 50 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1223, 1224–25 (2020) (discussing legislative developments).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
28. FED. TRADE COMM’N, USING CONSUMER REPORTS: WHAT EMPLOYERS NEED TO KNOW,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/using-consumer-reports-what-employersneed-know [https://perma.cc/KWH2-9WDC]. Others have written on the gaps in FCRA, practical
realities regarding enforcement, impediments to taking private action, the lack of meaningful consent
when workers must acquiesce to these employer requests as a condition of employment, and the
questionable applicability to contemporary data-collection practices. E.g., Mary Madden, Michele
Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities
for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 53, 84 (2017); Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit
Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 189–90 (2016); Pauline T. Kim & Erika
Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of Information under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61
ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 17, 26 (2016).
29. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28.
30. Id.
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adverse action based on the contents of such a report, the employer must
provide to the individual, inter alia, notice of the adverse action, name and
contact information for the company that supplied the report, and notice of
rights to dispute the accuracy or completeness of the report if timely
requested.31 FCRA is mostly about notice and corrections to the “ingredients”
in reports, less about fundamental uses of the information.32 If one is denied a
job or suffers some other adverse action based on such a consumer report, the
person’s recourse is to try to correct the record.
Other disclosure mandates are more useful in identifying and proving
certain types of violations. For example, some jurisdictions have enacted wagenotice laws that require employers to provide workers with a written notice at
the start of employment with specific information about wages, timing of
paychecks, identification and contact information of the employer, and other
terms of employment.33 Such disclosures can be important in cases of unpaid
wages where there is a dispute about the agreed-upon compensation or
uncertainty about the identity and whereabouts of the employer.
Under some state laws, an employee or former employee is entitled to see
her own personnel records upon request. The definition of “personnel records”
differs by statute, but it typically includes job applications, performance
reviews, and other documents used to assess qualifications and make decisions
regarding promotion, compensation, termination, and disciplinary action.34
The laws vary as to how, when, and what must be provided to an employee.
Some allow the employee to rebut information in those records. So, an
employee who believes, for instance, that she has been suspended based on
inaccurate information might write up her story to be placed in the file.35
Access to one’s own personnel records can be helpful in evaluating and proving
some claims. In a case alleging discriminatory firing, for example, where an
employer’s defense is that it terminated the plaintiff for bad performance or

31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
33. E.g., CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELS., Wage Theft Protection Act of 2011 – Notice to
Employees
(Mar.
11,
2016),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/FAQs-NoticeToEmployee.html
[https://perma.cc/TJ5Z-982Y]. Some notification laws are more targeted. See Estlund, Extending the
Case for Workplace Transparency, supra note 11, at 784 (citing federal and state laws requiring
disclosure for seasonal and migrant agricultural workers, and other low-wage workers).
34. See Barbara Kate Repa, State Laws on Access to Your Personnel File, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/employee-rights-book/chapter5-2.html
[https://perma.cc/XVH6-SUPP].
35. E.g., MASS. GEN. LS. ANN. ch. 149, § 52C.
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misconduct, the plaintiff might counter such a defense with documentation of
good performance or the lack of corrective actions in the file.36
The Older Worker Benefits Protection Act sets minimum standards for an
employee waiver of the right to sue for discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, designed to ensure that the waiver is
knowing and voluntary.37 When the release is sought in connection with a
reduction in force (RIF), the employer must provide employees who are over
forty years old with information about who was selected for the RIF, who was
not selected, their job titles, and ages.38 That data about coworkers might be
useful to someone over who has been laid off and suspects age discrimination.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), which
requires covered employers to “provide a workplace free from serious
recognized hazards and comply with standards, rules, and regulations” issued
under that statute,39 imposes various disclosure requirements on employers,
including warnings of potential safety hazards; information about injuries,
fatalities, illnesses, and exposures; and citations for violations. 40 Inspection
information is available to the public via the OSHA website, and one can search
establishments and locations to see at least some information regarding
complaints and inspections.41
36. See, e.g., Laxton v. Gap, Inc. 333 F.3d 572, 580 (5th Cir. 2003) (considering lack of
contemporaneous written documentation of complaints about plaintiff in denying summary judgment
on discrimination claim); Kalinoski v. Gutierrez, 435 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72 (D.D.C. 2006) (considering
plaintiff’s “stellar performance reviews” in concluding that she had “enough evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact about whether defendant’s proffered rationale was the real reason
defendant declined to select plaintiff for the position”). Requesting such records is a routine part of
most case evaluations for plaintiffs’ lawyers in jurisdictions that have such laws. See JOHN F. ADKINS,
BRIAN J. MACDOUNOUGH, BARBARA A. ROBB, JENNIFER A. YELEN, MASS. EMP. L., ch. 1, § 29.5, at
29–23 (4th ed. 2015) (“Make sure to get a copy of the complainant’s personnel file early in the
evaluation process.”).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2018).
38. 29 C.F.R § 1625.22 (f)(1) (2020).
39. 29 U.S.C 654 § 5(a).
40. U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WORKER RIGHTS AND
PROTECTIONS/EMPLOYER
RESPONSIBILITIES,
https://www.osha.gov/as/opa/worker/employerresponsibility.html [https://perma.cc/V36H-N3HT].
41. U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., ESTABLISHMENT SEARCH,
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.html [https://perma.cc/5HB8-EDFN]. OSHA does not
make public the outcomes of retaliation complaints. Deborah Berkowitz & Shayla Thompson,
OSHA Must Protect COVID Whistleblowers Who File Retaliation Complaints, N AT ’ L E MP . L.
P ROJECT , 1 (Oct. 2020), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/OSHA-Must-Protect-COVIDWhistleblowers-Who-File-Retaliation-Complaints-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LWA-RAQL]. Workers
or their representatives may file a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA, a part of the U.S. Department of Labor) if they believe the employer is not in compliance.

BERNT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

WORKPLACE TRANSPARENCY BEYOND DISCLOSURE

83

Some laws require disclosures to government agencies. For example,
employers covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended
(Title VII), with at least 100 employees, and certain federal contractors with
fifty or more employees, must “report annually the number of individuals they
employ by job category and by race, ethnicity, and sex.”42 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCCP) use this “EEO-1” information for purposes of
enforcement and to produce reports, with aggregated data, on workforce
demographics.43 Employers need not include data on age or disability in EEO1 reports.44
Public access to EEO-1 reports depends on whether the data is collected by
the EEOC pursuant to Title VII or by the OFCCP pursuant to Executive Order
11246.45 EEOC is prohibited by statutory language from making public data it
collects about specific employers unless a proceeding has been filed under Title
VII.46 Otherwise, EEOC makes this data available only in aggregate form.47
U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA 3021-06R, 11, 15 (2017),
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf [https://perma.cc/4N89-X7T6]. OSHA includes
protections from retaliation, albeit with a filing deadline of only 30 days. Id. OSHA does not provide
for a private right of action, so if OSHA does not pursue the matter, the employee’s options will depend
on the facts, and the jurisdiction, as discussed in Emily A. Spieler, Whistleblowers and Safety at Work:
An Analysis of Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1,
7, 21–22 (2017).
42. EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
81
F.R.
5113,
5114,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-02-01/pdf/2016-01544.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4ZRXFWH]. EEOC also collects data on union membership, government workforces and job patterns in
elementary and secondary schools. Id.
43. Id., U.S. OFFICE OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE
MANUAL,
Chapter
4,
Evaluation
of
EEO-1
Reports,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/manual/fccm/4b-pre-desk-audit-actions/4b12-evaluation-eeo-1reports [https://perma.cc/ZTR8-U89T].
44. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT ON DIVERSITY IN HIGH TECH
(2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/special-report/diversity-high-tech [https://perma.cc/4HQU-BK3F]
(“EEO-1 reports . . . data based on race, color, sex and national origin, but do not report data on age or
disability.”). Covered employers were briefly required (for years 2017–2018) to prepare EEO-1
“Component 2” reports, to include employee aggregated pay data, broken down by gender, race,
ethnicity, and job category. See discussion infra § V.
45. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/faqs/foia#ftn.id2 [https://perma.cc/PK9F-NL7C] [hereinafter
DEPT. OF LAB., FOIA FAQs]; U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Exec. Order No. 11,246, as amended,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/executive-order-11246/as-amended
[https://perma.cc/NW2Y5357].
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e); DEP’T OF LAB., FOIA FAQs, supra note 45.
47. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS – FREEDOM
OF
INFORMATION
REQUESTS,
https://www.eeoc.gov/foia/questions-and-answers-freedom-
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By contrast, EEO-1 data collected by OFCCP under Executive Order 11246
may be accessible through a request for records under FOIA.48 (Other
Department of Labor enforcement information is also available via FOIA, such
as information about violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).49)
However, under an exemption to FOIA, an agency may withhold “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person [that is]
privileged or confidential.”50 Employers that consider their EEO-1 data or other
material as confidential may therefore use FOIA Exemption 4 to keep the data
from public disclosure.51
In addition to EEO-1 data, OFCCP makes available on its website a dataset
of closed compliance evaluations and complaint investigations and some
Conciliation Agreements with offending employers.52
Some jurisdictions have recently passed laws requiring more transparency
about sexual harassment and discrimination claims. The Illinois Human Rights
Act, for example, now requires employers to disclose to the state Department

information-act-foia-requests [https://perma.cc/EJV9-GKGE]. In 2020, EEOC launched “EEOC
Explore, a new interactive data query and mapping tool that . . . allows users to analyze aggregate data
associated . . . [and] compare data trends across a number of categories, including location, sex, race
and ethnicity, and industry sector . . . .” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC LAUNCHES
NEW
DATA
TOOL
TO
TRACK
EMPLOYMENT
TRENDS
(Dec.
02,
2020),
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-launches-new-data-tool-track-employment-trends
[https://perma.cc/S2FQ-42MQ]. Files available via this tool contain “aggregate employment
characteristics without identifying any employer or employee.” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
EEOC
EXPLORE
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/EEOC%20Explore%20FAQs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C933-F4R4].
48. DEP’T OF LAB, FOIA FAQs, supra note 45. Covered federal contractors have additional
recordkeeping and disclosure requirements, including hiring data, compensation practices, personnel
policies, subject to FOIA. U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, FED. CONT.
COMPLIANCE
MANUAL,
§§ 1A06,
8,
1C02,
22–23,
2E,
82
(2020),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OFCCP/FCCM/508_FCCM_05012020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET4X-6VUA].
49. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ENFORCEMENT, https://enforcedata.dol.gov/homePage.php
[https://perma.cc/JV5F-ZVZ5].
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4).
51. See Jamillah Bowman Williams, Diversity as Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1688 (2019)
(“Since 2011, tech companies have routinely used [FOIA’s Exemption 4] . . . to prevent exposure of
diversity data collected by the government.”).
52. U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
LIBRARY, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/foia/library#Q3 [https://perma.cc/AR6A-UGTS].
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of Human Rights annual data regarding adverse judgments or rulings involving
sexual harassment and discrimination.53
Other disclosure mandates that are not designed specifically to protect
workers might nevertheless produce useful information, such as court filings,
mandated corporate disclosures, and other public records.54
B. Laws Prohibiting Employers from Blocking Information
Some laws prohibit employers from stifling information flow among
workers. Executive Order 13665, for example, prohibits covered federal
contractors from retaliating against “any employee or applicant for employment
because such employee or applicant has inquired about, discussed, or disclosed
the compensation of the employee or applicant or another employee or
applicant.”55
The NLRA has been interpreted to prohibit employers from imposing pay
secrecy rules on covered employees (unionized or not), in that such rules
interfere with the right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”56 The NLRA,

53. The Department will publish such data annually, without identifying the parties. If the
Department is investigating a charge of sexual harassment or discrimination, it may request
information about private settlements for the previous five years. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-108
(2019). For a snapshot of recent legislative developments in other states, see Andrea Johnson, Ramya
Sekaran, Sasha Gombar, 2020 Progress Update: MeToo Workplace Reforms in the States, NAT’L
WOMEN’S
L.
CTR.
(Sept.
2020),
https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/v1_2020_nwlc2020States_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ7B-W5UV].
54. E.g., The Securities and Exchange Act requires covered companies to disclose any material
legal proceedings currently pending against it, as well as “any such proceedings known to be
contemplated by governmental authorities.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2020); See EUGENE K. HOLLANDER
& DAVID W. NEEL, EMPLOYMENT EVIDENCE § 7:50 (2019) (recommending that plaintiff’s counsel
review employer’s website and annual reports: “If the decisionmaker is a senior executive of
Defendant, check to see if any statement can be construed to have a discriminatory animus, e.g., in an
age case, where the CEO makes a statement in an annual report that he is entering into the next decade
with ‘a young management team.’”).
55. Exec.
Order
No. 13,665, 79 FED. REG. 20,749
(Apr.
8,
2014),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/04/11/2014-08426/non-retaliation-for-disclosureof-compensation-information [https://perma.cc/HV2H-Z3JA].
56. 29 U.S.C. § 157; Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows and the Future
of Pay Equity, 120 COLOM. L. REV. 547, 588 (2020) [hereinafter Lobel, Knowledge Pays] (“The
National Labor Relations Board . . . has consistently held that prohibiting employees from discussing
their salaries violates their right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid.”); See 1 N. PETER
LAREAU, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.04[4][a]–[b], 12 (2003, with 2021 supp.) (discussing
scrutiny of pay secrecy rules under NLRA).
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however, excludes wide swaths of employees (supervisors, for example), and
imposes minimal penalties for violations.57
Some states have passed anti-pay secrecy statutes, under which employers
may not prohibit employees from talking with their coworkers about their
compensation.58 A few are broader. California, for example, requires that an
employer, “upon reasonable request, shall provide the pay scale for a position
to an applicant applying for employment,”59 and Colorado requires that job
postings include “the hourly or salary compensation, or a range of the hourly or
salary compensation, and a general description of all of the benefits and other
compensation to be offered to the hired applicant.”60
C. Information Available Without Mandates
Employers might voluntarily disclose their anti-discrimination policies,
workplace demographics, or statements supporting diversity.61
Other
information is gathered and distributed by labor unions or advocacy
organizations.62 Workers also learn of information in the press and can read
(not necessarily reliable or accurate) stories on social media platforms and
websites that review employers.63
57. Kate Andrias & Brishen Rogers, Rebuilding Worker Voice in Today’s Economy, ROOSEVELT
INSTITUTE, 4–6 (2018) (discussing gaps in coverage of NLRA); Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law,
126 YALE L.J. 2, 6, 26 (2016) (noting the “weak enforcement mechanisms, slight penalties, and lengthy
delays” for NLRA complaints).
58. Stephanie Bornstein, Disclosing Discrimination, 101 B.U. L. REV. 287, 321 (2021).
59. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(c) (2019).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-5-201 (2020).
61. See, e.g., Jena McGregor, Urged to Back Up Pledges for Racial Justice, 34 Major Firms
Commit to Disclose Government Workforce Data, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/29/corporate-diversity-data-pledge/
[https://perma.cc/G7W4-7YJG] (reporting that more than thirty major companies have agreed to
publicly share government diversity reports).
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 W. VA. L.
REV. 921, 933 (2015) [hereinafter Hirsch, Worker Collective Action] (noting that AFL-CIO-supported
Working America “appears to have one of the more-developed employer databases, with data on over
400,000 employers’ labor and employment law violations, mass layoffs, and offshoring practices.”).
And see discussion supra at § III.D about the roles of intermediaries.
63. See Hirsch, Worker Collective Action, supra note 62, at 932–33 (“[W]ebsites such as
Glassdoor.com provide information . . . that include salary, basic business facts, and rankings and
reviews from employees . . . . [E]ven for these larger employers, many specific jobs have little or no
information. . . . [F]or most smaller employers, the amount of information available is lacking in both
quality and quantity.”); Jason Sockin & Aaron Sojourner, What’s the Inside Scoop? Challenges in the
Supply
and
Demand
for
Information
about
Job
Attributes
2–3
(2020),
http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/DATA_2020/sojourner_a5669.pdf [https://perma.cc/227LYDM7] (finding even former employees are concerned about career damage if they volunteer candid
negative information about employers on websites).
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IV. CONDITIONS THAT INHIBIT INFORMATION FLOW
Some of the disclosures noted above might yield information that would
aid a worker in recognizing a violation of law and stating a claim. But this can
be a scavenger hunt, one made more challenging by the particular nature of
employment relationships, the web of substantive laws governing them, and
some procedural hurdles.
As Schauer has observed: “At times, it seems that transparency is a prime
example of the old adage that where you stand depends on where you sit.”64 I
suggest that what you see depends on where you sit. Let’s consider a worker’s
seat on the (figurative) shop floor—or outside the door trying to get in. This is
typically a vulnerable position with an obstructed view.
A. Employment At-Will
The employment-at-will doctrine essentially says that absent a contract
(e.g., a collective bargaining agreement or individual contract), an employer
may fire (and by extension, take other adverse actions against) an employee for
any reason or no reason without incurring legal liability.65 Employment-at-will
is the presumption in nearly every state.66
Courts in most jurisdictions have recognized, and legislatures have enacted,
various (often cramped) exceptions to the rule.67 Statutory exceptions include
laws prohibiting adverse actions for union activities; for discrimination based
on race, sex, disability, age, and other characteristics; and for retaliation for
exercising one’s rights under those laws.68 Many jurisdictions have also
enacted statutes protecting employees from retaliation for taking certain
actions—for example, reporting unlawful conduct to authorities69—and most
jurisdictions recognize at least some common law protections. 70 Workers must

64. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1342.
65. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 409, 450 (2020) (“Employment-at-will stands as the baseline rule nearly everywhere in the
United States. Under that rule, an employer is free to ‘terminate an employee for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason at all.’”). Montana is the exceptional state. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW, § 2.01 cmt.a, reporters’ notes (AM. L. INST. 2015). Public employees might have additional
rights under statutory or constitutional provisions. With few exceptions, independent contractors are
not covered by workplace protections.
66. Bagenstos, supra note 65, at 450.
67. Id. at 452.
68. Lisa J. Bernt, Wrongful Discharge of Independent Contractors, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
39, 43, 43 n.23 (2000).
69. Id. at 43.
70. Id.
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plead and prove an exception to the employment-at-will rule to sustain an action
against an employer.71
With relatively few workers protected these days by collective bargaining
agreements (about six percent of the private-sector workforce),72 most are
employed at-will, and must tread carefully if they want to get and keep a job.
They are often reluctant to ask questions or make waves for fear of sending the
wrong signals to an employer.73 And an employee who is thinking about raising
concerns about unlawful practices, such as discrimination, will have to weigh
the risks of retaliation, perhaps in the form of termination, reduced hours, pay
cuts, increased workloads, miserable job conditions, calls to immigration, or
negative references.74 Even if such retaliation is actionable, that still might
leave one with no paycheck and a speculative and expensive legal journey as
they try to prove their termination (or other adverse action) was because of their
complaints of discrimination or other “protected” conduct.75 It also means they
will have to explain to prospective employers why they lost their last job. Their
exit options might be further limited if they are one of the nearly one-fifth of
workers in the U.S. (including many in low-wage occupations) bound by
noncompete agreements.76

71. Id. at 43–44.
72. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Union Members—2020 (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YL3X-YKJ2];
NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT – OVERVIEW I (2008),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3JPW-GAAJ].
73. Estlund discusses signaling concerns in Just the Facts, supra note 11, at 387–88.
74. For discussion of survey data on frequency and forms of retaliation, and how such fears affect
willingness to make complaints, see Bradley A. Areheart, Organizational Justice and
Antidiscrimination, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1921, 1938–39 (2020); Charlotte Alexander & Arthi Prasad,
Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1104 (2014); ANNETTE BERNHARDT,
RUTH MILKMAN, NIK THEODORE, DOUGLAS HECKATHORN, MIRABAI AUER, JAMES DEFILIPPIS, ANA
LUZ GONZÁLEZ, VICTOR NARRO, JASON PERELSHTEYN, DIANA POLSON & MICHAEL SPILLER,
BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN
AMERICA’S CITIES 24–25 (2009), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vn389nh [https://perma.cc/J9Q328WW].
75. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.003, COMPLIANCE MANUAL:
COMPENSATION DISCRIMINATION, § 10-II (2000), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-10compensation-discrimination [https://perma.cc/ZJ8B-N7H4] [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, COMPENSATION] (“All of the anti-discrimination statutes prohibit retaliation for opposing
violations of the statutes or participating in the statutory complaint process.”).
76. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications
3
(2016),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Non_Compete_Contracts_Economic_Effects_and_Policy
_Implications_MAR2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/L654-7GWR].
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B. Limited Access to Legal Information and Assistance
Despite numerous “know your rights” poster requirements, studies have
shown that workers are largely uninformed or misinformed about their rights,
and how to enforce them.77
Legally ignorant workers are less likely to know what information is
important, where to look for it, how to gather it, and what to do with it. They
are less likely to know the differences between enforceable and unenforceable
agreements or workplace restrictions. Yet talking with a lawyer could itself
lead to retaliation if the employer learns of it, and only some jurisdictions
recognize a cause of action when someone is fired for consulting counsel. 78
It can also be difficult to find affordable legal help. Few workers, especially
if they have just lost a job, can afford to pay “full price” for legal services,
which might run hundreds of dollars per hour.79 At the same time, law firms
are often reluctant to accept employment cases on a contingency basis, where
the client does not pay hourly fees but shares a percentage of any recovery with
the firm.80 Firms that do take contingency matters tend to be selective and will
require an especially strong set of facts at the outset before they will assume the
risk of not getting paid for their services.81
77. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law
Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1558 n.236 (2014) (“Workers’
limited understanding of the employment at-will default has been both documented empirically and
much discussed by workplace law scholars.”); Alexander & Prasad, supra note 74, at 1110 (finding
that “approximately 59% of low-wage, front-line workers did not know their minimum wage and
overtime rights and 78% did not know how to file a government complaint . . . .”).
78. Lisa J. Bernt, Finding the Rights Jobs for the Reasonable Person in Employment Law, 77
UMKC L. REV. 1, 28–29 n.141 (2008).
79. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & MARK D. GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
AND LITIGATION: ACCESS, PROCESS, AND OUTCOMES 12 (2014) (“[A]ttorneys in our sample reported
charging an average rate of $398 per hour.”).
80. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Conflict and Employment Relations in the Individual Rights Era, in
MANAGING AND RESOLVING WORKPLACE CONFLICT 1, 21–22 (David B. Lipsky, Ariel C. Avgar & J.
Ryan Lamare eds., 2016) (“Under a standard contingency fee arrangement . . . the cost of financing the
case is shifted from the employee to the lawyer, who then also bears the financial risk of losing.”);
ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 125 (Univ. of Chic. Press 2017)

(“There was wide variation as to how plaintiffs’ lawyers in our sample negotiated payment. A few
operated on a contingency-fee basis, expecting the bulk of payment only when and if a client prevailed.
Others operated on a contingency-fee-plus, where the ‘plus’ was an up-front fee (designed to screen
out clients who are not ‘serious’) and/or an hourly fee to be ‘topped up’ with funds from the award if
the case prevailed. Many lawyers reported no longer being willing to work on contingency and said
they billed entirely by hourly rate.”).
81. Colvin & Gough, supra note 79, at 13 (“On average, the attorneys [surveyed] indicated that
they would need a minimum of $58,000 in potential settlement value or damages to justify accepting

BERNT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

90

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:73

It can be especially difficult for low-wage workers to find affordable
representation, as potential damages consist primarily of lost compensation.82
So, higher-paid employees will make more attractive contingency-fee clients.83
Alternatively, they are better able to afford hourly rates.84 Even a consultation
might be out of one’s budget, as intakes can be time-consuming and many
attorneys will charge for them.85 In addition, research suggests that law firms
are more reluctant to take on clients bound by arbitration agreements, which are
more common today (as discussed below).86 Given these calculations of risk
and potential recovery, plaintiffs’ law firms agree to represent a very small
fraction of potential clients who approach them.87 There are also scarce free
legal services available for most types of employment matters.88
a case on a non-pro bono basis.”); ROBERT E. MCKNIGHT, JR., REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE
VII ACTIONS § 11.01 (5th ed. 2020) (“In the practice of employment discrimination law, case selection
is critical; no lawyer can hope to stay in business for very long while spending substantial amounts of
time and that yield no eventual compensation. But case selection isn’t easy, which is evident from the
number of appellate opinions that affirm summary judgments for defendants. The problem is we have
to pick cases on the basis of EEOC investigative files and other incomplete information, then dig hard
in discovery and hope for the best. Since there’s nothing that can be done in case selection to remedy
a lack of information that can only be obtained through discovery, we have to focus on the aspects of
case selection that we can do something about.”). Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible
Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 933–50 (2006), discusses interplay of statutory fee-shifting
provisions and contingency-fee agreements.
82. BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 126 (“Since damages recovered in
employment civil rights cases are often determined by calculating back pay, the potential plaintiff’s
salary was very important for determining whether to take a particular case [on a contingency fee
basis].”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. MCKNIGHT, supra note 81, § 11.01[B] (cautioning that a no-consultation-fee policy can
swamp a law office’s intake process); Amy Myrick, Robert L Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Race and
Representation: Racial Disparities in Legal Representation for Employment Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 15
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 743 (2012) (discussing the practice of many plaintiffs’ counsel to charge a
consultation fee).
86. Mark D. Gough, Employment Lawyers and Mandatory Arbitration: Facilitating or
Forestalling Access to Justice? 22 ADVANCES IN INDUS. AND LAB. REL. 105, 119 (Emerald Grp.
Publ’g Ltd., 2016); Alexander J. S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in
Employment, 35 BERKLEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 71, 85 (2014); see also discussion infra § IV.C.1.
87. Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Laura Beth Nielssen, Situated Justice: A Contextual
Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 22
(2012) (“[P]laintiff attorneys report that, on average, they took only one of every ten clients who
approached them, even though they believed that many of the cases they rejected involved
discrimination.”).
88. See BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 271 (“Less than 1% of our random
sample of [discrimination] case filings entailed representation by a public interest law firm.”);
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 74, at 1111 n.149 (“Study after study has documented the gulf between
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C. A Lone-Complainant-Driven System
The U.S. has a predominantly reactive, complainant-driven system of
employment law enforcement, one that requires workers, themselves, to
recognize, plead, and prove violations. Charlotte Alexander and Arthi Prasad
aptly call this a “bottom-up” system.89 While some agencies, such as EEOC
and the U.S. Department of Labor, are empowered to initiate complaints
without a particular complainant, the reality is that agency-initiated charges and
investigations are rare.90
Not only is this a complainant-driven system, but it is largely a lonecomplainant-driven system. Collective action (broadly defined) has been
hampered by recent developments in employer practices and court decisions.91
At the same time, individual employees face various impediments in bringing
claims.92

civil legal needs and lawyer availability, particularly for ex ante legal advice.”); Stephen Churchill,
Making Employment Civil Rights Real 6 (Amicus Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev., Working Paper No. 09-65,
2009),
https://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2010/02/Churchill-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EYT-7LEN] (discussing dearth of legal-aid options for employment civil rights
claims).
89. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 74, at 1070–71. David Weil describes the approach of many
enforcement systems as reactive, i.e., “respond[ing] to complaints and then bring[ing] individual
offending employers into compliance.” David Weil, Creating a Strategic Enforcement Approach to
Address Wage Theft: One Academic’s Journey in Organizational Change, 60 J. INDUS. REL. 437, 441
(2018) [hereinafter Weil, Strategic Enforcement].
90. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMMISSIONER CHARGES AND DIRECTED
INVESTIGATIONS,
https://www.eeoc.gov/commissioner-charges-and-directed-investigations
[https://perma.cc/3NVE-FMNR] (“From fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2019, the EEOC initiated
an average of thirteen new Commissioner charges per year addressing allegations under Title VII, the
[Americans with Disabilities Act] and/or [Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act], and an average
of 138 new directed investigations per year addressing allegations under the ADEA and/or the EPA.
This represents a very small proportion – far less than 1% – of the Commission’s annual charge
volume. . . . From fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2019 the EEOC filed a total of nine lawsuits
based on a Commissioner’s charge or directed investigation, or an average of about two lawsuits per
year.”). Alexander & Prasad, supra note 74, at 1070 n.3 (“The U.S. Department of Labor may also
initiate its own affirmative ‘directed investigations,’ but those are vastly outnumbered by complaintdriven investigations.”).
91. See BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 263.
92. Id., discussing the “individualization” of rights claims. Their large-scale study of cases filed
1988–2003 in federal court found that 93% of cases were brought by a sole plaintiff. Anna Stansbury,
Do US Firms Have an Incentive to Comply with the FLSA and the NLRA? 19 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l
Econ., Working Paper No. 21-9, 2021), https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/do-usfirms-have-incentive-comply-flsa-and-nlra [https://perma.cc/P65C-YP4] (analyzing violations of
wage-and-hour laws and the NLRA, concluding that workers might not bring claims because they are
uninformed about their rights, violations can be difficult to detect, they lack time and resources to bring
a claim, they fear retaliation, and/or they are bound by MAAs or other waivers).
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i. Nondisclosure Agreements, Non-disparagement Provisions, and Other
Secrecy Rules
Confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) in settlement and
severance agreements have long been commonplace. 93 The upshot of such
provisions is that an employee with a potential or actual legal claim cannot
“compare notes” with a former employee who might have useful information
or evidence.
NDAs now appear to be on the rise outside the context of settlement and
severance agreements and are increasingly imposed on employees as a
condition of getting and keeping a job.94 Many employers are also using nondisparagement provisions, which require employees to keep quiet about
anything that might cast the employer in a negative light. 95
There are some regulatory limits on these practices. For example, an
employer cannot prevent a worker from reporting unlawful conduct to
government agencies or cooperating in investigations.96 Several states have
recently put limits on the use of NDAs in settlements of discrimination matters,
some with particular attention paid to sexual harassment claims or settlements
of claims that use public funds.97 And overbroad secrecy requirements have
been found in some cases to violate the NLRA, where they inhibit employee
speech and interfere with the ability to work together to improve terms and
93. BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 19 (“When plaintiffs settle their claims, they
typically sign a confidentiality agreement . . . .”). The EEOC, however, will not enter into settlements
subject to NDAs. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SETTLEMENT STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES, https://www.eeoc.gov/settlement-standards-and-procedures [https://perma.cc/7QFFYJCW].
94. Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan.
30,
2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change
[https://perma.cc/9CQA-RB75] [hereinafter Lobel, NDAs are Out of Control] (NDAs “are increasingly
common in employment contracts . . . . These contracts have grown not only in number but also in
breadth . . . [and] are now routinely included in standard employment contracts upon hiring.”).
95. Lobel offers an example of a non-disparagement clause used by a major corporation:
[Y]ou shall not at any time, directly or indirectly, disparage the Company, including making or
publishing any statement, written, oral, electronic or digital, truthful or otherwise, which may
adversely affect the business, public image, reputation or goodwill of the company, including its
operations, employees, directors and its past, present or future products or services.
Id.
96. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NONWAIVABLE
EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS
UNDER
EEOC
ENFORCED
STATUTES
(1997),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-non-waivable-employee-rights-undereeoc-enforced-statutes [https://perma.cc/J5GF-8FWP].
97. See Johnson, Sekaran & Gombar, supra note 53; Rachel S. Spooner, The Goldilocks
Approach: Finding the ‘Just Right’ Legal Limit on Nondisclosure Agreements in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 37 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 331 (2020) (surveying recent legislation and proposals).
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conditions of employment.98 However, not all employees are protected by the
NLRA, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has a tendency to
sway back and forth (depending on who is in the White House) when reviewing
employer practices.99
Even if unlawful or unenforceable, gag rules can still have a chilling effect.
An at-will employee who is not quite sure about what they can say under the
employer’s rules might be more inclined to keep quiet, for fear of losing their
job or being sued themselves.100
ii. Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration Provisions and Limits on Class Actions
In recent years, employers have increasingly required non-unionized
workers, as a condition of employment, to agree before a dispute arises to have
all employment-related disagreements decided in binding arbitration.101 These
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements (MAAs) bar access to the courts
for legal claims, including those alleging statutory violations.102 Instead, a
private neutral would resolve any future dispute between the parties.

98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(1). See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW CH. 6.III.D (John e. Higgins,
Jr., Patrick E. Deady, Joseph J. Torres, Barry J. Kearney & Anna Wermuth eds., 7th ed. 2017 & Supp.
2020) (discussing NLRB scrutiny of confidentiality rules); LAREAU, supra note 56, § 4.04[4] (same).
99. See discussion supra Section III.B; Robert Sprague, More and More Employers Are Spying
on Workers Online. Federal Regulators Are Okay With It, PROMARKET, July 30, 2020,
https://promarket.org/2020/07/30/more-and-more-employers-are-spying-on-workers-online-federalregulators-are-okay-with-it/ [https://perma.cc/EC3S-3K6F] (“The fluctuating state of labor law,
exemplified by the NLRB influenced by whoever is in the White House, resembles a constantly
swinging pendulum—not unlike Edgar Allan Poe’s—with respect to employee workplace
protections.”).
100. See Lobel, NDAs are Out of Control, supra note 94 (“[E]mployers threaten litigation even
under those circumstances in which NDAs would be void. New empirical studies show that employees
are largely uninformed about these protections, and the routinely broad language of confidentiality
clauses along with the threat of litigation chills even this protected speech.”).
101. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 3, 4 (2019) [hereinafter Colvin, Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration] (differentiating
MAAs in nonunion settings from arbitration system used in disputes between unions and employers).
102. Some administrative options are open even to those who have signed an arbitration
agreement. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that an MAA does not bar
EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief). And the California Supreme Court has held that
the state’s Private Attorneys General Act, which “authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil
penalties on behalf of the state against his or her employer for Labor Code violations committed against
the employee and fellow employees, with most of the proceeds of that litigation going to the state” is
not preempted by FAA. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348, 360 (2014), cert.
denied, 574 U.S. 1121 (2015). Other states are considering private attorneys general statutes. Juvan
Bonni, Johnathan Ence, Lauren Smith & Jackson Tyler, State Legislative Update, 2020 J. DISP. RESOL.
221, 228–234 (2020).
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The practice of using MAAs has grown so much in the past twenty years
that, according to a study by Alexander Colvin, a bit more than half of privatesector, non-unionized employees in a broad range of industries and occupations
are now bound by one.103 A worker might be presented with an MAA in a job
application, on the first day of work in a stack of paperwork, in a “clickthrough” document, or in a mass mailing. Generally, “so-called ‘agreements’
to arbitrate are unilaterally imposed by employers on employees who likely are
not aware the terms exist, and, in any case, have little choice but to accept the
provision if they want to get or keep their jobs.”104 Yet, MAAs are typically
enforced.105 Courts have even enforced MAAs where someone merely applied
for a job but was not hired.106
Many have objected to MAAs, for various reasons, treated extensively
elsewhere. In addition to the often-coercive way in which MAAs are forced on
workers, critics of MAAs argue that the arbitration process favors employers
and is subject to limited judicial review.107 There are concerns about “repeat
player” effects; that is, bias on the part of arbitrators in favor of parties (i.e.,

103. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION ACCESS TO
THE COURTS IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION AMERICAN WORKERS 5 (Econ. Pol’y Inst.

2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-thecourts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/
[https://perma.cc/J4G9-5J2Y]
[hereinafter Colvin, Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration].
104. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 171 (2019); see also Judith
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2810 (2015) (“[O]bligations to arbitrate [can] arise not from
negotiation but by signing (or clicking on) documents, some of which stipulate that the drafter of the
provisions ‘may change any terms’ unilaterally.”); Sternlight questions whether nonnegotiable MAAs
should be referred to as “agreements”: “[E]mployees do not typically ‘agree’ to these terms in any
meaningful sense, as they often are not aware of the terms much less knowledgeable about their
implications.” Id. at 171 n.103. I, too, use the word “agreement” here with reservation. I have argued
that such provisions should not be enforced where there is no meaningful consent. Lisa J. Bernt,
Tailoring a Consent Inquiry to Fit Individual Employment Contracts, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 31 (2012).
105. Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers are Using Mandatory
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1321 (2015) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Disarming Employees] (“[I]t has become increasingly difficult for employees to defeat
employment arbitration clauses. And it is expensive and time consuming for employees to try to mount
such challenges.”).
106. E.g., Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, 148 F.3d 373, 378 (4th Cir. 1998) (enforcing MAA in
job application in failure-to-hire discrimination case); Fernandes v. Dillard’s, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d
607, 611 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (same).
107. Michael J. Zimmer, Title VII’s Last Harrah: Can Discrimination Be Plausibly Pled? 2014
LOY. U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 71–72 (“[A]wards rendered by arbitrators cannot be overturned for mistakes
of either law or fact since the grounds to vacate an award are limited to process issues. Further,
arbitrators do not need to know the law and many do not.”).
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employers) that they are more likely to see repeatedly.108 And there is data
suggesting that employees tend to win less frequently and with lower damage
awards in arbitration, as compared to litigation. 109
The most important objections for purposes of this discussion are that
arbitrations are private and that they limit collective activity. Typically, these
arbitrations are closed-door proceedings, and the arbitrators’ decisions are
unpublished.110 Even the existence of an MAA itself might be subject to an
NDA.111 Estlund and others have written about the disappearance of
employment matters into a black hole, saying that disputes subject to MAAs
might “simply evaporate before they are even filed.” 112
Furthermore, MAAs increasingly contain clauses whereby the employee is
prohibited from bringing, or joining in, class or other multi-plaintiff actions
either in court or in arbitration proceedings. 113

108. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 686
(2018) [hereinafter Estlund, Black Hole] (“[As] one arbitrator said, ‘Why would an arbitrator cater to
a person they will never see again?’”).
109. Colvin, Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 101, at 17–18 (“Attorneys
who represent employees are less likely to take on clients who are subject to mandatory arbitration,
given that arbitration claims are less likely to court, when damages are awarded, they are likely to be
significantly lower than Court awarded damages. Attorney reluctance to handle such claims effectively
reduces the number of claims that are brought since, in practice, relatively few employees are able to
bring employment law claims without the help of an attorney.”); Gough, supra note 86, at 107
(“[E]mployee win rates and award amount in arbitration are substantially lower than outcomes in
litigation.”). Others have challenged survey data and conclusions, pointing out that litigation-versusarbitration results do not account for some variables, such as EEOC filings. E.g., Samuel Estreicher,
Michael Heise & David S. Sherwyn, Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical
Research, 70 RUTGERS L. REV. 375 (2018).
110. Resnik, supra note 104, at 2853–54 (“[N]o central registries account for the hundreds of
ADR decision makers, the claims filed before them, their rules, fees, or outcomes. . . . [T]he hearings
are generally closed, and the rules permit arbitrators to bar third parties from attending hearings.”);
Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 105, at 1323 (“Arbitration providers do not need to open
their files to researchers and most have not.”). For a discussion of California’s requirement that
arbitration providers make public some information about the matters that they decide, see David
Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L.
REV. 457, 463 (2016).
111. See, e.g., Erik Encarnacion, Discrimination, Mandatory Arbitration, and Courts, 108 GEO.
L.J. 855, 857 (2020) (citing example).
112. Estlund, Black Hole, supra note 108, at 682; Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note
105, at 1312 (“[A]vailable empirical evidence now shows . . . that employees who are covered by
mandatory arbitration provisions almost never file arbitration claims.”).
113. Colvin’s study found that of employees subject to MAAs, about 41 percent were also
subject to class action waivers. Colvin, Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 101, at
17. Sternlight notes that some MAAs preclude employees from joining claims even with one other
employee. Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 105, at 1351.
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This proliferation of MAAs can be traced to some key Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Enacted in 1925, the
FAA provides that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”114 The FAA in its early years was of concern
primarily in the context of commercial disputes, playing little role in the field
of employment law.115 Things changed with a series of Supreme Court
decisions enforcing arbitration agreements in employment and consumer
matters and holding that efforts at the state level to curb MAAs are preempted
by the FAA.116
The 1991 Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane upheld the enforceability of MAAs in a case brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.117 In 2018, the Supreme
Court held in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis that MAAs are enforceable in
employment agreements, even when they prohibit class or collective actions.118
Such waiver, the Court concluded, did not violate Section 7 of the NLRA,
which gives employees the right to engage in “concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”119
During this period of pro-arbitration decisions, the Supreme Court also
tightened standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23),
arguably making it more difficult for workers to certify class actions—often
the only economical way for those with individually small damage awards to

114. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
115. Colvin, Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 101, at 5.
116. Id. at 5–7 (providing summary of case law); Colvin & Gough, supra note 79, at 107
(discussing the expanding reach of FAA, starting with commercial cases and moving into other
spheres). In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011), the Court held that the
FAA preempts state laws that “condition[] the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”
117. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26–27 (1991). In 1992, the year after
the Gilmer decision, only about two percent of employees were bound by MAAs. Colvin, Growing
Use of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 103, at 3. Other notable Supreme Court decisions include:
Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001), holding that the FAA’s exemption of “‘contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce’” is confined to transportation workers; American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 233, 235–36 (2013), holding in a dispute between merchants and a credit
card company that a waiver of class arbitration was enforceable under the FAA even when the
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating the dispute exceeds the potential recovery; and Lamps Plus,
Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019), holding that under the FAA, “[c]ourts may not infer from
an ambiguous agreement that parties have consented to arbitrate on a classwide basis.”
118. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
119. Id. at 1624.
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bring claims.120 Rule 23(a)(2) requires a party seeking class certification to
show, inter alia, that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.”121
In Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes, decided by the Supreme Court in 2011, the lower
court had approved the certification of a class of about 1.5 million current and
former female employees of Wal-Mart alleging sex discrimination in pay and
promotions.122 Wal-Mart had a practice of giving its individual stores managers
discretion in making decisions about pay and promotions.123 The plaintiffs
argued that in the exercise of such discretion, management made decisions that
discriminated against women, all women working in the company’s stores were
affected by this bias, and that class certification was appropriate.124 The
Supreme Court disagreed, finding insufficient “glue” holding together the
allegations of sex discrimination given the multitude of jobs categories (at
different levels of the company’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in
thousands of stores across fifty states):
The crux of this case is commonality—the rule requiring a
plaintiff to show that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.”
....
Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those
decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination
of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a
common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.
....
The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence
convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing
discretion by local supervisors over employment matters.
....
Other than the bare existence of delegated discretion,
respondents have identified no “specific employment
practice”—much less one that ties all their 1.5 million claims
together.125
120. Areheart, supra note 74, at 1943–44 (“Class actions have long been understood as
indispensable for antidiscrimination: class actions generate publicity and can better deter future
discrimination; discriminatory people or policies often harm more than just one employee in the
organization; and the damages are often low enough that aggregation is necessary to incentivize
lawyers to bring such suits. Indeed, the advisory notes on Rule 23(b)(2) specifically mention civil
rights lawsuits as ones where class action status may be particularly appropriate.”).
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
122. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011).
123. Id. at 343.
124. Id. at 345.
125. Id. at 349, 352, 355, 357.
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While opinions differ as to the impact of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the decision
presents—at least—an additional hurdle for some workers with claims that are
not viable as individual actions.126 That said, class actions were uncommon
even before these recent Supreme Court decisions. One landmark study of
federal cases filed between 1988 and 2003 found that class actions in
discrimination matters amounted to only about 1% of cases sampled.127 And
some statutes, like the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), do not allow for traditional class actions under Rule
23, in which named plaintiffs will spearhead the litigation and potential class
members can opt out. Rather, EPA and ADEA cases require each individual
plaintiff to affirmatively opt-in to a case after receiving a notice of the
litigation.128
iii. Isolated Workers, Closely Monitored
Various workplace developments have effectively isolated many workers
in ways that can inhibit collective action and information-sharing.

126. Compare Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment Discrimination Class Actions After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803, 803 (2015) (“[I]t appears that courts are proceeding much
as they did prior to [Wal-Mart v. Dukes]. Employment discrimination class actions have never been
easy to certify, nor have they been plentiful, and that remains true today.”), with Areheart, supra note
74, at 1944 (“[I]t has become substantially harder to bring (and win) class action cases. Courts have
increasingly applied more stringent interpretations of the commonality requirement, as well as required
more in the way of merits before certifying the class.”), and JOSEPH A. SEINER, THE SUPREME
COURT’S NEW WORKPLACE 63 (2017) (“[T]he overall view has been that the [Wal-Mart v. Dukes]
decision presents substantial problems for plaintiffs—thus undermining civil rights. The academic
scholarship has been quite harsh on the case.”).
127. BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 270.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Alexander & Prasad, supra note 74, at 1106 (“[T]he Fair Labor
Standards Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act have never allowed
traditional class actions, in which a few named plaintiffs represent a largely anonymous class, but
instead require each individual additional plaintiff to affirmatively opt into a case. As a result, workers
are increasingly forced to bring cases alone or in small groups, with each worker’s identity exposed,
setting the stage for retaliation by unscrupulous employers.”). For discussion of the differences in
certification standards between class actions under Rule 23 and collective actions under ADEA, EPA,
and FLSA, see Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, No Longer a Second-Class Class Action? Finding
Common Ground in the Debate Over Wage Collective Actions with Best Practices for Litigation and
Adjudication, 11 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2019). EEOC may seek class wide relief under Title VII without
being certified as the class representative under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. General Tel. Co. of Northwest, Inc.
v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 321 (1980).
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Some employees don’t even know who they work for, how many other
employees answer to the same entity, or whether anyone else is in similar
straits, all of which can make it more difficult for workers to complain.129
Weil writes of the modern disaggregated or “fissured” workplace, where
employment arrangements often differ from the traditional relationship
between one well-defined employer and its employees: “The basic terms of
employment—hiring, evaluation, pay, supervision, training, coordination—are
now the result of multiple organizations. Responsibility for conditions have
become blurred. Like a rock with a fracture that deepens and spreads with time,
the workplace over the past three decades has fissured.”130
Employees might not have a fixed, centralized worksite or communal
space—more are working from home. These trends toward remote or scattered
work make it less likely an employee will communicate in person with
coworkers.131 Wherever they are working, employees are often subject to novel
methods of monitoring that can chill communications with co-workers.
Employee monitoring is hardly new. A century ago, Henry Ford monitored
his employees, at work and at home, dispatching his “sociological department”
to gather information about the lifestyles and proclivities of employees,
including their drinking, spending, household tidiness, and union activity.132
But technological advances now allow employers to take surveillance methods
to new levels. Employers can now use trackers, cameras, and wearable
technology to monitor workers, even when off duty.133 Employers can capture
and analyze the content, length, and tone of conversations.134 Often with the
129. Weil, Strategic Enforcement, supra note 89, at 444 (“[W]orkers from a staffing agency may
be working side-by-side with employees of the host company – or may have had their status switched
from an employee to one of independent contractor. This murkiness undermines the likelihood of
complaints.”).
130. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 7 (2014). Bales and Stone describe work
relationships ranging from long-term employment to project-based work, often involving “multiple
interlocking and cascading tiers of employers all at once,” where “employee leasing firms, payroll
contractors, human resources (HR) service providers, and numerous types of ancillary enterprises also
perform employer functions.” Richard A. Bales & Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web at Work:
Artificial Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, 41 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1, 3 (2020).
131. Tammy Katsabian, The Rule of Technology – How Technology is Used to Disturb Basic
Labor Law Protections, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 895, 918–920 (2021) (discussing trend toward
telework, even before COVID-19 pandemic, and how online communication falls short as a substitute
for in-person interactions).
132. Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law and
Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COL. L. REV. 961, 966 (2017). Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz provide
a brief history of employer surveillance. Limitless Worker Surveillance, supra note 24, at 738.
133. Bodie, Cherry, McCormick & Tang, supra note 132, at 963.
134. Id.
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assistance of third-party data miners and vendors, employers can also now
collect, aggregate, and process personal and consumer data about workers,
which can be used to predict who is most likely to job hop, get pregnant, take
parental or medical leave, file a workers’ compensation claim, call in sick,
complain about working conditions, or join a union.135
Employer surveillance can be hard for workers to avoid, as there are few
legal limits on such practices in the private sector.136 As Matthew Bodie
135. Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, “GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee
Privacy”, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 713–14 (2019) (“‘[B]ig data’ offers the opportunity to aggregate and
cross-reference information to gain access to some of our most intimate secrets, including our disease
risks, our reproductive choices, and our personal relationships. . . . [Big] data analytics could reveal
which employees are more likely to get sick, which employees are more likely to take parental leave,
and which employees are more likely to be under stress at home.”); The Future of Work: Protecting
Workers’ Civil Rights in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 116th Cong.
17 (2020) (statement of Jenny R. Yang, Senior Fellow of the Urban Institute),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/ED/ED07/20200205/110438/HHRG-116-ED07-Wstate-YangJDJ20200205.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2QL-63W4] [hereinafter Yang Testimony] (“Increased surveillance
creates a very real risk that employers will use technology to monitor who workers are communicating
with in a manner that may suppress worker dissent and organizing efforts, which in addition to raising
concerns under the [NLRA], could also interfere with the ability for workers to raise and organize
around civil rights issues such as harassment. Access to this information could also lead to retaliatory
measures against employees who exercise these rights.”). Others have reported on and testified to such
practices. E.g., David Streitfeld, How Amazon Crushes Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/technology/amazon-unions-virginia.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2UA-B89E]; Sam Adler-Bell & Michelle Miller, The Datafication of Employment
How Surveillance and Capitalism Are Shaping Workers’ Futures without Their Knowledge, CENTURY
FOUNDATION 12, (Dec. 19, 2018) https://tcf.org/content/report/datafication-employment-surveillancecapitalism-shaping-workers-futures-without-knowledge/?session=1 [https://perma.cc/PS53-R33Y];
Kelly Trindel, Chief Analyst for the Office of Research, Information and Planning, Big Data in the
Workplace: Examining Implications for Equal Employment Opportunity Law, Testimony at the
Meeting of the EEOC (Oct. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Trindel Testimony]; See also discussion infra
Section V.B about use of automated decision-making systems.
136. There are some state laws that speak to certain types of monitoring and data collection. See
Ajunwa, Limitless Worker Surveillance, supra note 24. Some states have enacted statutes to prevent
employers from requesting passwords to personal internet accounts to get or keep a job. State Social
Media
Privacy
Laws,
NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-lawsprohibiting-access-to-social-media-usernames-and-passwords.aspx [https://perma.cc/3EXA-69RZ].
For discussions of limited privacy protections, see, e.g., Bales & Stone, supra note 130, at 30–34;
Bodie, Cherry, McCormick & Tang, supra note 132, at 985–1031; Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz,
Limitless Worker Surveillance, supra note 24, passim. Unlike the U.S., the European Union and
numerous other countries have comprehensive data privacy laws. Michael Kearns and Aaron Roth
discuss the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) “a sweeping set of laws designed
to limit algorithmic violations of privacy and to enforce still-vague social values such as
‘accountability’ and ‘interpretability’ on algorithmic behavior.” MICHAEL KEARNS & AARON ROTH,
THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM 15 (2020). And the European Union in April 2021 proposed new
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observes: “Never have employers been able to know so much about their
employees, and so easily.”137
D. Important, but Limited, Role of Intermediaries
Intermediaries might help workers gather and understand relevant
information, act as conduits for collective action, and, in some cases, provide
legal advice and representation. Worker centers, for example, have played an
increasingly important role in this regard. Worker centers are advocacy groups
typically organized around a particular issue (e.g., safety), community (e.g.,
Latinx workers), or industry (e.g., farm workers).138 Unlike unions, worker
centers do not collectively bargain on behalf of members.139 Their services
range and might include political advocacy, informational resources,
community support, or pressure on employers to improve working conditions
or pay practices.140
A union, even when not acting as a bargaining agent, might provide a key
informational role, for example in gathering and interpreting safety data and

regulations on the use of Artificial Intelligence. Proposal for a Regulation on a European approach
for Artificial Intelligence, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21, 2021), https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/proposal-regulation-european-approach-artificial-intelligence
[https://perma.cc/D3DY-LRYK]. Some states have recently enacted statutes to regulate data collection
and usage. State Laws Related to Digital Privacy, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-relatedto-internet-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/L9AC-JB5X] (outlining requirements of statutes enacted in
California, Nevada, and Virginia). It is unclear at this point whether GDPR-type of data regulation
can or will meaningfully address the concerns here. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Future Work, 2020
U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 931, 935 (2020) [hereinafter Hirsch, Future Work] (discussing and noting the
limitations of the GDPR, especially as it applies in the workplace).
137. Bodie, Cherry, McCormick & Tang, supra note 132, at 987.
138. Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50 N.Y.
L. REV., 417, 419 (2005).
139. Id. at 427.
140. Janice Fine, Victor Narro & Jacob Barnes, Understanding Worker Center Trajectories, in
NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION, POLICY, AND MOVEMENT IN A NEW ECONOMIC
AGE 9, 9–11 (Janice Fine, Linda Burnham, Kati L. Griffith, Minsun Ji, Victor Narro & Steven C. Pitts,
eds. 2018) (discussing the variety of worker centers and the services they provide); WEIL, supra note
130, at 255 (“Worker centers, community organizations, immigrant rights groups, and other advocacy
groups play a variety of informational and educational roles for workers both inside and outside the
workplace. Some also function as labor market intermediaries, particularly in day labor markets.”)
(discussing examples); David Weil, Why Complain?, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 91 (2005) (“A
large number of empirical studies demonstrate that workers are more likely to exercise rights where
they have an agent that assists them in use of those rights.”).
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facilitating complaints.141
Other intermediaries include hybrid
worker/community groups or other advocacy organizations that play various
roles, such as collecting data on employers’ workplace practices or facilitating
concerted action outside the traditional model of collective bargaining.142
Nongovernmental organizations might gather and analyze information
voluntarily supplied by employers.143 Some intermediaries will offer legal
counsel in bringing cases before courts or agencies.144
Intermediaries, however, have played a minimal role overall in representing
groups of employees who bring legal claims, especially discrimination cases.145

141. Aditi Bagchi, Who Should Talk? What Counts as Employee Voice and Who Stands to Gain?
94 MARQ. L. REV. 882, 884 (2011) (“If a union is present and entitled to relevant data, it may act as a
filter and only provide what is most useful to the employee, or perhaps even offer its assessment of the
data.”); FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 5, at 86–87, 100 (discussing the comprehension of safety
information and the “key intermediary role” of unions); see also United Farm Workers of America v.
Foster
Poultry
Farms
(Super.
Ct.
No.
20-CV-03605),
http://majlabor.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/TR-UFW-v.-Foster-Poultry-Farms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J4PH-B4DT]
(obtaining preliminary injunction against poultry processor to take safety measures to prevent spread
of COVID-19).
142. For discussion and examples, see STEVEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN, WORKED UP 18–
20 (2019), and Catherine L. Fisk, Reimagining Collective Rights in the Workplace, 4 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 523, 524 (2014).
143. See Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 11, at 367 (“Many . . . intermediaries [] exist—
private organizations, for profit and not for profit, that evaluate and compare companies on the basis
of their general worker friendliness, family friendliness, diversity along lines of gender, race and
ethnicity, sexual orientation, or disability, or more broadly. But these intermediaries currently depend
largely on employers’ voluntary disclosure . . . .”).
144. For example, AARP Foundation Litigation represented the plaintiff in Kleber v.
CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 306 (2019), an age
discrimination case. And Justice at Work, an organization in Massachusetts, offers legal support to
employees through worker centers, with a focus on litigating cases of unpaid wages.
https://jatwork.org/ [https://perma.cc/F5S6-ZLAC].
145. Discussing limitations of alt-labor groups are Nicole Hallett, From the Picket Line to the
Courtroom: A Labor Organizing Privilege to Protect Workers, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
475, 478–83 (2015) (noting limited resources of worker centers and issues of privilege and
confidentiality around communications between workers and non-lawyer advocates); WEIL, supra note
130, at 255 (“[B]oth legal restrictions and the practical fact that worker centers and related
organizations operate outside the walls of the workplace complicate their role in this regard.”)
(discussing examples). Compare this to housing and lending discrimination, where like in employment
discrimination, it can be difficult to “name” the injury: “‘It might be hard for somebody to articulate
and recognize [housing discrimination] immediately,’ said Kate Scott, executive director of the Equal
Rights Center in Washington. But it usually starts with ‘a bad feeling about what’s going on.’” Dima
Williams, Challenging Discrimination When Purchasing a Home, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/03/18/report-housing-discrimination-renter-buyer
[https://perma.cc/DR3W-TY2H]. The non-profit National Fair Housing Alliance (a consortium of
hundreds of organizations throughout the U.S.) reports that in 2019, private non-profit fair housing
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Data collected by Ellen Berrey, Robert L. Nelson, and Laura Beth Nielsen bear
this out, as they conclude that “collective legal mobilization is rare in the system
of workplace discrimination litigation.”146 Instead, the overwhelming majority
of cases are brought by individual plaintiffs, without the support of other
workers or a public interest firm or organization.147
V. PARTICULARLY OPAQUE SCENARIOS: PAY AND HIRING
The visibility of information is especially limited in cases of unlawful pay
practices and discrimination in hiring. Following is a discussion of two such
scenarios: (1) Pay equity and pay discrimination on the basis of sex, and (2) age
discrimination in hiring.
A. Pay Equity and Pay Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
Research shows a persistent pay gap between men and women.148 Yet few
employees have enough information even to suspect a violation of pay equity
or pay discrimination laws.149

organizations processed the overwhelming majority of housing discrimination complaints. Fair
Housing Organizations “continue to address approximately three times as many complaints as the
government agencies combined.” NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, FAIR HOUSING IN JEOPARDY,
2020
FAIR
HOUSING
TRENDS
REPORT
32,
https://nationalfairhousing.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/NFHA-2020-Fair-Housing-Trends-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PDW78R8]. And see FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 5, at 62, for discussion of intermediaries in the
area of mortgage lending.
146. BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 69.
147. Id.
148. Lobel, Knowledge Pays, supra note 56, at 555–56 (“Even after accounting for skill,
experience, occupation, industry, job description, and factors such as evaluation and performance,
which have a degree of subjectivity, a significant portion of the [male-female pay] gap persists.”);
Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1049–51 (2012) (“[N]ot all of
the documented wage gaps can be explained by factors that are likely to be related to business necessity,
such as degrees, skills, hours worked, or even internal performance evaluations.”) (footnote omitted)
(citing studies). My focus here is on pay gaps by sex, as they might implicate the Equal Pay Act, as
well as Title VII.
149. Claims filed with the EEOC 1966–2014 show that equal-pay complaints make up about 3%
of total cases filed. BERRY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 43. Lobel, Knowledge Pays, supra
note 56, at 565 (“[P]ay equity claims are often only brought by women when something else such as
an adverse action, failure to promote, or harassment occurs.”). Of the total charges filed with the EEOC
in fiscal year 2019, 1.5 percent included claims for violation of the Equal Pay Act. Press Release, U.S.
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2019 Enforcement and Litigation Data
(Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-2019-enforcement-andlitigation-data [https://perma.cc/4N8U-FBLN]. From 2011 to 2020, the EEOC brought only fortyseven matters that included an EPA claim. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ALL STATUTES
(CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) FY 1997 – FY 2020, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/all-statutescharges-filed-eeoc-fy-1997-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/9UTQ-JRBE].
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Recall Emma, who wonders if she is getting paid less because she is a
woman. It seems like the men at my job get paid more. How can I get more
information about coworkers pay and duties? Should I talk with my coworkers?
If I do, will we get in trouble?
An attorney will evaluate her situation within the frameworks of: (1) the
Equal Pay Act (EPA), which essentially requires employers to pay male and
female employees at the same establishment equal wages for equal work;150 and
(2) Title VII, which prohibits, inter alia, compensation discrimination based on
sex.151 The coverage of the EPA and Title VII overlap, but there are some
important differences.152
There is no requirement under the EPA for a plaintiff to prove intentional
discrimination.153 Instead, a prima facie EPA violation is established by
showing that: “(1) the complainant receives a lower wage than paid to an
employee of the opposite sex in the same establishment; and (2) the employees
perform substantially equal work (in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility)
under similar working conditions.”154

150. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10–II (distilling text of
the EPA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).
151. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including
pregnancy), and national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e. In Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731,
1742 (2020), the Court held that Title VII encompasses bias based on sex stereotypes and gender
identity.
152. A claim of unequal compensation based on sex can be brought under the EPA, Title VII, or
both. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10–II. Emma might also have
protections under state and local laws. See Discrimination and Workplace Harassment, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/discrimination.aspx [https://perma.cc/44HX-89BV].
153. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640 (2007), superseded by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. Note, however, that “willfulness”
is important to the filing deadline and recovery: “The time limit for filing an EPA charge [is] . . . within
two years of the alleged unlawful compensation practice or, in the case of a willful violation, within
three years. . . . In addition, the EPA limits the recovery of back pay to two years (or three years if the
violation was willful) before the filing of suit or the end of successful conciliation.” EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-IV.A (footnote omitted).
154. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-IV.B.
Skill is measured by factors such as the experience, ability, education, and training required to
perform a job. . . . Effort is the amount of physical or mental exertion needed to perform a job. . . .
Responsibility is the degree of accountability required in performing a job. Factors to be
considered in determining the level of responsibility in a job include: the extent to which the
employee works without supervision; the extent to which the employee exercises supervisory
functions; and the impact of the employee’s exercise of his or her job functions on the employer’s
business. . . . Working conditions consist of two factors: surroundings; and hazards.
Id. § 10-IV.E.2 (emphasis omitted).
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“Comparators” are essential in EPA cases. A plaintiff must be able to point
to at least one person of the opposite sex in the same establishment who is, or
was, getting paid more: “A complainant cannot compare herself or himself to a
hypothetical male or female; rather, the complainant must show that a specific
employee of the opposite sex earned higher compensation for a substantially
equal job.”155 It might be a current or former employee.156
The evaluation of “equal” or “similar” work is highly fact-specific and can
be difficult to establish.157 An EPA plaintiff needs specific and detailed
information about the actual duties (not just job titles) of such comparator(s).158
Only if the plaintiff can establish the prima facie showing will the burden shift
to the defendant employer to “prove that the compensation difference is based
on a seniority, merit, or incentive system, or any other factor other than sex.”159
Unlike the EPA, a disparate treatment case under Title VII requires that a
plaintiff prove that her employer has discriminated against her because of her
sex.160 This does not necessarily require comparators; a plaintiff might prevail
without one.161 This can be done with direct evidence of discrimination, as in

155. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-IV.E.1. Laura Palk
and Shelly Grunsted discuss difficulties for LGBTQIA employees: “The EPA requires that plaintiffs
prove their cases through reference to an opposite sex comparator, but then defers to the employer’s
subjective definition of who is ‘the opposite sex.’ This makes LGBTQIA plaintiffs’ cases essentially
unwinnable.” Laura Palk & Shelly Grunsted, Born Free: Toward an Expansive Definition of Sex, 25
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3–4 (2018).
156. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-IV.E.1.
157. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The Overuse of Summary
Judgment in Equal Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 815, 831 (2012–2013) (“[T]he prima facie
standard under the EPA . . . requires an intricate factual examination of the compared jobs . . . .”). See
Galligan v. Detroit Free Press, 436 F. Supp. 3d 980, 998–99 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (finding plaintiffs had
not satisfied prima facie burden under EPA because they “did not identify . . . a complete list of the
specific job duties of any male [comparator],” concluding that a partial list of duties was insufficient).
158. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-IV.E.2 (“In
comparing two jobs for purposes of the EPA, consideration should be given to the actual duties that
the employees are required to perform. Job content, not job titles or classifications, determines the
equality of jobs.”).
159. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-IV.B.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). For review and discussion of causation standards under the
various discrimination statutes, see, for example, Hillel J. Bavli, Cause and Effect in Antidiscrimination
Law, 106 IOWA L. REV. 483 (2021); Katie Eyer, The But-For Theory of Anti-Discrimination Law, VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3801699
[https://perma.cc/MQX7-WESA]. Some types of discrimination cases might also be brought under a
disparate impact theory, where the plaintiff challenges a facially neutral employment practice that has
a disparate impact on a protected group. See infra note 171.
161. A claim of compensation discrimination can be brought under Title VII “even if no person
outside the protected class holds a ‘substantially equal,’ higher paying job.” EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-II.
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those rare instances where a manager tells an employee “I’m paying you less
because you are a woman.”162 Far more likely, Emma would need to rely on
indirect evidence, sometimes described as a “convincing mosaic” of
circumstantial evidence, “bits and pieces” of evidence to support an inference
of discriminatory intent and to demonstrate that the employer’s stated
justification for its actions is pretextual.163
A recent Second Circuit case provides an illustration. The plaintiff in Lenzi
v. Systemax, Inc., a sex discrimination case under Title VII, produced evidence
that her employer paid her at below market for her position, that it paid nearly
all male peers at her workplace above market rate for their respective positions,
and that the defendant’s chief financial officer had made graphic and
disparaging remarks about women.164 In reversing the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the employer, the Second Circuit explained the
difference between the EPA and Title VII:
Title VII makes actionable any form of sex-based
compensation discrimination. . . . To be sure, one way an
employer might discriminate against an employee because of
her sex is to pay her less than her male peers who perform equal
work. In such circumstances, an employee may seek redress
under the EPA or, if the circumstances admit “an inference of
discrimination” [under] Title VII. However, it by no means
follows that this is the only way in which an employer might
achieve its discriminatory purpose. For example, an employer
might “hire[ ] a woman for a unique position in the company,”
but then pay her less than it would “had she been male.” If a
Title VII plaintiff were first required to establish an EPA
violation, she would be without redress under those
circumstances, even if her employer flatly “admitted that her
salary would have been higher had she been male.” “Similarly,
if an employer used a transparently sex-biased system for wage
determination, women holding jobs not equal to those held by
men would be denied the right to prove that the system is a

162. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-III.A n.16 (“If there
is an explicit policy or other direct evidence of compensation discrimination, cause should be found.
Such evidence might include, for example, discriminatory statements by officials of the respondent,
combined with evidence of pay disparities, or documentation that the respondent’s pay practices are
applied differently to those inside and outside the protected class.”).
163. Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019). Not all courts use this
articulation. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has discarded the “convincing mosaic” terminology
and the idea of direct and indirect proof as distinct piles of evidence. Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,
834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).
164. Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2019).
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pretext for discrimination.”165
But while the court in Lenzi concluded that the plaintiff need not produce
the same comparator evidence under Title VII as is required under the EPA,
that case did rest in large part on a showing of how men were paid at her
workplace, and how they were paid vis-a-vis market rates.166 The plaintiff then
would still need information about her male coworkers and their compensation
rates.167 And the reality in most Title VII pay discrimination cases is that a
plaintiff will need information about other employees’ pay and duties.168
What information might Emma be able to gather to support a claim under
either the EPA or Title VII? Unless she stumbles upon some useful information
about coworkers’ pay (perhaps an anonymous note),169 she will need to find
information about other employees’ duties and pay. That will probably not be
easy to do. Despite some prohibitions against pay secrecy rules, they are still
common, and even without such restrictions, employees can be reluctant to
share.170 Counsel can search legal databases for litigation, reports of similar
discrimination, or other publicly available records that might provide some

165. Id. at 110 (internal citations omitted).
166. “Taken together, the fact that Systemax paid [plaintiff] below the market rate for her
position while paying her male peers above market rate, along with Reinhold’s pervasive
disparagement of women, are enough to carry [her] past the prima facie stage.” Id. at 112.
167. Id. at 111.
168. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, COMPENSATION, supra note 75, § 10-III.A (“Because direct
evidence of discrimination is rare, investigators typically must evaluate whether comparative evidence
supports a finding of compensation discrimination.”) (footnote omitted). See Laing v. Fed. Express
Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[Courts consider] comparator evidence to be a particularly
probative means for discerning whether a given adverse action was the product of a discriminatory
motive.”); LEX K. LARSON & KIM H. HAGEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 8–76, (2d ed. 2020)
(“Probably the most commonly employed method of demonstrating that an employer’s explanation is
pretextual is to show that similarly situated persons of a different race or sex [or other protected class]
received more favorable treatment.”).
169. LILLY LEDBETTER, GRACE AND GRIT: MY FIGHT FOR EQUAL PAY AND FAIRNESS AT
GOODYEAR AND BEYOND 5 (2012) (recounting how she discovered pay disparities when someone
slipped her an anonymous note with a list of names and salaries). See also Charlotte S. Alexander,
Transparency and Transmission: Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market Responses
to Workplace Problems, 48 CONN. L. REV. 177, 179–80 (2015) (writing of a woman who learned of
pay disparity because her husband worked for the same employer); Sternlight, Disarming Employees,
supra note 105, at 1348 n.234 (describing a plaintiff who said “she had no reason to believe her salary
was unfair until she accidentally stumbled on documents showing the salaries of her male
counterparts.”).
170. JAKE ROSENFIELD, YOU’RE PAID WHAT YOU’RE WORTH AND OTHER MYTHS OF THE
MODERN ECONOMY 57–64 (2021) (“Pay secrecy policies—workplace rules, formal or informal, that
ban or discourage workers from discussing their pay with one another—are the norm in private-sector
workplaces . . . .”) (citing survey data).
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useful leads.171 Such a search, however, will not yield information about other
employees who have arbitrated or settled claims with NDAs. And if at the end
of a consultation there is not enough information available to support a claim
or at least warrant further review, counsel will likely decline the matter.
Emma might go to the EEOC (or a state or local fair employment practices
agency), which she generally must do to exhaust administrative remedies under
Title VII (not the EPA).172 She can do this pro se, as is common.173 To lodge
a complaint with the EEOC, Emma must be timely and specific with her
allegations.174 If the EEOC accepts her complaint and sends it into investigation
(doubtful without at least some information about other employees), then the
EEOC might get more information from the employer.175
171. See, e.g., Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1109–10 (5th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that evidence of discrimination against other members of the plaintiff’s protected class
may be highly probative, depending on the circumstances); Phillip v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 945 F.2d
1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing district court decision excluding evidence of other discrimination
lawsuits filed against defendant).
172. The EEOC maintains “work sharing agreements” with state and local Fair Employment
Practices Agencies to coordinate investigation of charges dual-filed under federal, state, local laws.
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2020 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT,
https://www.eeoc.gov/fiscal-year-2020-annual-performance-report [https://perma.cc/23UL-VEH6].
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, TIME LIMITS FOR FILING A CHARGE,
https://www.eeoc.gov/time-limits-filing-charge [https://perma.cc/56AX-79RA] (“Under the Equal
Pay Act, you don’t need to file a charge of discrimination with EEOC. Instead, you are allowed to go
directly to court and file a lawsuit.”).
173. At the EEOC, “it appears pro se filings may be the rule, not the exception.” Fed. Express
Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008).
174. 29 C.F.R § 1601.12 (2020) (“Each charge should contain . . . [a] clear and concise statement
of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices . . . .”).
The EEOC asks questions about other workers in its intake questionnaire:
Describe who was in the same or similar situation as you and how they were treated. For example,
who else applied for the same job you did, who else had the same attendance record, or who else
had the same performance? Provide the race, sex, age, national origin, religion, or disability of
these individuals, if known, and if it relates to your claim of discrimination. For example, if your
complaint alleges race discrimination, provide the race of each person; if it alleges sex
discrimination, provide the sex of each person; and so on. . . . Of the persons in the same or
similar situation as you, who was treated worse than you?
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE, https://www.hoopa-nsn.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/EEOC-COMPLAINT-FORM-FOR-OTHER-AGENCIES-THAT-ARENOT-A-TRIBAL-GOVERNMENT.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU63-E6ST].
175. Maryam Jameel, More and More Workplace Discrimination Cases are Closed Before
They’re Even Investigated, PUBLIC INTEGRITY (June 14, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/inequalitypoverty-opportunity/workers-rights/workplace-inequities/injustice-at-work/more-and-moreworkplace-discrimination-cases-being-closed-before-theyre-even-investigated/
[https://perma.cc/D7XF-H7JF] (describing EEOC’s process of weeding out “low priority” complaints
without an investigation: “Since 2008, the EEOC has more than doubled the share of
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If at the end of the investigation process, the EEOC finds “reasonable
cause” that there has been a statutory violation, it will attempt to settle the
matter through a conciliation process.176 If the matter does not settle, the EEOC
will either bring suit in the case itself (rarely), or issue a “right-to-sue letter”
informing the complainant of the right to bring a claim in federal court within
ninety days.177 The EEOC takes very few cases into court on behalf of
complainants, even if there has been a finding of reasonable cause—which
itself is a tiny percentage of EEOC filings (three percent in fiscal year 2019).178
If the EEOC declines to take the matter into court, Emma will need to find
affordable counsel to represent her or, more dauntingly, file a court complaint
pro se.179 If she files in federal court, she can expect to face a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,

complaints . . . that it places on its lowest-priority track, effectively guaranteeing no probes, mediation
or other substantive efforts on behalf of those workers. About 30 percent of cases were shunted to that
category [in 2018], according to internal data obtained by the Center for Public Integrity through a
public-records request.”).
176. 28 C.F.R 42.609 (2003).
177. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, WHAT YOU CAN EXPECT AFTER YOU FILE A
CHARGE, https://www.eeoc.gov/what-you-can-expect-after-you-file-charge [https://perma.cc/V8NHGNCJ]; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FILING A LAWSUIT, eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/W9NK-69CK].
178. The EEOC’s “reasonable cause” rate was three percent in Fiscal Year 2019. The EEOC
found “no reasonable cause” in 69.5% of complaints. Remaining complaints might be settled,
withdrawn, administratively closed, or otherwise resolved. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
ALL
STATUTES
(CHARGES
FILED
WITH
EEOC)
FY
1997
–
FY
2020,
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/all-statutes-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-1997-fy-2020
[https://perma.cc/XU7D-CJF7]. Bornstein, supra note 58, at 291 (“[O]f the roughly 75,000 to 100,000
charges of discrimination and harassment it received in each of the past twenty years, the EEOC itself
litigated only between 114 and 465 cases each year—or fewer than 0.5%.”); SEINER, supra note 126,
at 7 (“The EEOC will typically bring between 200 and 400 lawsuits a year . . . [representing] an
extremely small fraction of the charges that are filed in a given year, which fluctuate between 75,000
and 100,000 total charges.”).
179. A fraction of complainants who receive a right-to-sue letter will file a suit in court. BERRY,
NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 41–42 (“The ratio of lawsuits to charges (sometimes referred to
as the conversion rate) fluctuates between 15% and 30% for most years . . . .”). A significant number
of those who do file in federal court (about one in five) will do so unrepresented by counsel. Id. at 58
(pro se rate for discrimination cases filed in federal court from 1988–2003 was 23%); Mark D. Gough
& Emily S. Taylor Poppe, (Un)Changing Rates of Pro Se Litigation in Federal Court, 45 L. SOC.
INQUIRY 567, 578 (2020) (documenting “20 percent of employment civil rights cases involving at least
one pro se party.”); Mitchell Levy, Empirical Patterns of Pro Se Litigation in Federal District Courts,
85 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1840 (2018) (using administrative records of civil cases filed in federal
district courts 1998–2017, finding that 19% of employment discrimination cases in federal court were
brought by pro se plaintiffs).
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opposition to which is arguably now more difficult in the wake of recent
Supreme Court decisions.180
The pleading requirement in federal court used to require only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”181
and courts would dismiss a complaint under 12(b)(6) only if it was “beyond
doubt” the plaintiff could prove “no set of facts” that would establish liability.182
In a pair of cases decided in 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Supreme court altered
the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). First, in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, the Court introduced a new “plausibility” standard, one that
calls for pleading enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence” of the claim, and “nudge[] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible . . . .”183 The court fleshed out this plausibility
standard two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal: “[Fed. R. Civ. P. 8] does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. . . . Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”184
A more rigorous pleading standard can be especially difficult for
discrimination plaintiffs, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
discrimination, and information that might help the plaintiff meet that burden

180. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on 12(B)(6)
Motions, 46 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 603, 653–54 (2012).
181. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (2010).
182. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
183. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570.
184. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
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is in the hands of the employer.185 The plaintiff cannot access that information
unless they can defeat a motion to dismiss and get into discovery.186

185. See Areheart, supra note 74, at 1947 (“[F]actual development is particularly difficult in
employment discrimination cases where the touchstone is often intent—something that is nearly
impossible to establish without access, often through discovery, to the employer’s personnel and
policies. Heightened pleading standards thus result in a catch-22: the plaintiff’s claim cannot survive
to the discovery phase without having sufficient facts, but the plaintiff cannot obtain sufficient facts
without discovery.”) (footnotes omitted); Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Procedural Hurdles in the
Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 621, 627 (2011) [hereinafter Malveaux, Clearing
Procedural Hurdles] (“[P]laintiffs’ complaints die on the vine not because they lack merit, but because
plaintiffs do not have the same access to information that the defendant does. By raising the pleading
bar to plausibility, the Supreme Court has created an untenable situation for plaintiffs challenging
discrimination where there is informational inequality.”). There is some debate regarding the impact
of the plausibility standard on dismissal rates in discrimination cases. Compare Roger Michalski &
Abby K. Wood, Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424 (2017)
(finding no evidence on state level that raising pleading standards affected plaintiff behavior; observing
no decrease in filings; finding no increase in motions to dismiss and no increase in the grant rate on
motions to dismiss), and JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J.
BATAILLON, MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011) (“[T]here
was a general increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim . . . [but t]here was . . . no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to
amend in civil rights cases and employment discrimination cases.”), with Morgan L.W. Hazelton,
Judicial Impact and Factual Allegations: How the Supreme Court Changed Civil Procedure through
the Plausibility Standard, 9 J.L. & CTS. 159, 182 (2021) (finding “some evidence that a lack of
information keeps civil rights claimants from being able to adapt to the new pleading standard in
comparison with torts cases.”); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading,
101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2122 (2015) (“Contrary to the conclusions reached by the FJC in its 2011
study, . . . data show[s] that dismissals of employment discrimination and civil rights cases have risen
significantly in the wake of Iqbal.”), and Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed
Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1029
(analyzing decisions, finding higher rate of dismissals in Title VII cases after Twombly).
186. While it is not necessary to plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, Emma’s counsel would be prudent to nail
down the facts necessary for the prima facie case as early as feasible—before taking on the risk of a
contingency fee arrangement and filing a complaint. Counsel must also satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,
which requires, inter alia, that:
By presenting to the court a pleading . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances: . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery . . . .
Parties will also share information under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A), which requires pre-discovery
disclosures including names of individuals likely to have discovery information; documents to support
claims or defenses; computation of damages; and applicable insurance agreements.

BERNT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

112

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:73

If Emma can defeat a motion to dismiss, then she will get additional
information in the (often protracted, expensive) discovery process, probably
followed by a motion for summary judgment.187
Many have discussed the high hurdle for discrimination plaintiffs looking
to defeat a motion for summary judgment in federal court, with the result that
very few such cases go to trial.188 I concentrate here on access to information
necessary to identify a grievance and state a claim that will survive a motion to
dismiss and at least get into the discovery process. But would-be plaintiffs and
counsel need to consider what is likely on the other side of the motion-todismiss gate. Such obstacles add to the speculative nature of these cases, which
is a disincentive for workers to look to the legal process, and for counsel to take
on these matters in the first place.
B. Age Discrimination in Hiring
Research suggests that discrimination in hiring is pervasive.189 Yet
relatively few failure-to-hire cases are filed. One large-scale study of
discrimination cases filed in federal courts found that only nine percent of such

187. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
SEINER, supra note 126, at 47 (“The summary judgment motion was not typically used as often in the
early days of Title VII. It has now become routine . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
188. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 74, at 1948 (discussing Supreme Court decisions on
summary judgment standards); SEINER, supra note 126, at 47–48 (“[E]ven before Twombly and Iqbal,
few cases were making it to trial. They were proceeding past the complaint and discovery phase of the
litigation, but were being rejected at summary judgment. . . . In one of the better[-]known studies on
this question, which was conducted by Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab, the authors were able to
conclude that only 3.7 percent of employment cases go to trial.”) (footnotes omitted).
189. See, e.g., Aaron Rieke, Urmila Janardan, Mingwei Hsu & Natasha Duarte, Essential Work:
Analyzing the Hiring Technologies of Large Hourly Employers, UPTURN, at 5–6 (2021) [hereinafter
Rieke, Essential Work], https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2021/essential-work/files/upturnessential-work.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y9R-KQ5T] (“[D]ecades of research shows that employers tend
to discriminate against women, people of color, and people with disabilities, and a recent meta-analysis
suggests that little has improved over the past 25 years.”) (footnotes omitted) (citing studies); David
Neumark, Strengthen Age Discrimination Protections to Help Confront the Challenge of Population
Aging, BROOKINGS, at 5 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthen-age-discriminationprotections-to-help-confront-the-challenge-of-population-aging/
[https://perma.cc/RB8U-NVPU]
(“[T]he most rigorous evidence we have establishing age discrimination concerns discrimination in
hiring.”); Victoria A. Lipnic, The State of Age Discrimination and Older Workers in the U.S. 50 Years
After the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
at 21 (June 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/reports/state-age-discrimination-and-older-workers-us-50years-after-age-discrimination-employment
[https://perma.cc/6WP9-YSKP]
(“[S]tudies
find
substantial evidence of age discrimination in hiring, as most hiring discrimination occurs when an
interview is offered or not.”).
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cases alleged discriminatory hiring.190 The EEOC’s statistics on filings with
the agency show similarly low percentages of failure-to-hire cases. In fiscal
year 2019, for example, failure-to-hire cases made up about ten percent of
charges filed with the EEOC.191 And as a percentage of complaints received by
the OFCCP (against employers who are federal contractors) from 2017 to 2020,
hiring claims ranged from four to nine percent.192
These numbers should not surprise, as hiring decisions are made behind a
curtain, often without an interview or any communications beyond submitting
a resume in some fashion. Few job seekers have enough information even to
suspect a violation of law.
Recall Alex, the fifty-year-old who can’t find a job as a software designer:
I keep applying for jobs I know I am qualified to do, but I can’t land one.
Employers seems to be looking for younger people.
An attorney will evaluate his situation within the framework of the ADEA,
which prohibits discrimination against people who are forty and older.193
The plaintiff in a failure-to-hire case brought under the ADEA must show
that they were not hired because of their age.194 That “because of” language in
190. BERRY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 56 (finding that only 9% of such cases
alleged discriminatory hiring, versus 19% of claims that allege discriminatory failure to promote).
191. Data available on EEOC website: U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, BASES BY
ISSUE (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) FY 2010 – FY 2020, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/bases-issuecharges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2020
[https://perma.cc/ZN38-HVD9];
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ALL STATUTES (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) FY 1997 – FY 2020,
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/all-statutes-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-1997-fy-2020
[https://perma.cc/E6PE-PELJ]. 7,077 complaints that included hiring claims out of 72,675 total
complaints filed with the EEOC in 2019. Promotion, recall, and reinstatement are categorized
separately by EEOC. Id.
192. U.S. OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, OFCCP BY THE NUMBER,
FISCAL YEAR DATA TABLES, COMPLAINTS RECEIVED, BY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/about/data/accomplishments
[https://perma.cc/MK4H-JDVP]
(figures are rounded). Promotion, assignment, and recall claims are categorized separately by the
OFCCP.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2018). My attention here is on age discrimination, as there are some
particular difficulties for plaintiffs looking to the ADEA for relief. See supra note 171. He might also
be protected by state statutes, local statutes, or both. See Iris Hentze & Rebecca Tyus, Protections in
the Workplace: Equal Pay and Age Discrimination, NAT’L CONF. OF STATES LEGISLATURES, (Aug.10,
2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/equal-pay.aspx [https://perma.cc/77V82LWH].
194. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2018). Some discrimination statutes allow for a claim brought under
a disparate impact theory, under which plaintiffs challenge a facially neutral employment practice
(such as a standardized test) that has a disparate impact on a protected group. A disparate impact
theory is not available in all discrimination cases. Ajunwa discusses differences across federal
employment statutes, noting that Title VII and the ADA have disparate impact clauses in the statutes;
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the statute has been interpreted to mean that “a plaintiff must prove . . . that age
was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer[’s adverse] decision.”195
Alex might prove discrimination through direct evidence.
The
quintessential (exceedingly rare) example of direct evidence would be a
management memorandum saying, “Don’t hire Alex, he’s too old.”196 More
commonly, a plaintiff tries to prove age discrimination with indirect evidence.
Alex might establish a prima facie case of age discrimination for failure to
hire by demonstrating that: (1) he is over forty years old; (2) he applied for and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
despite such qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) following such rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with
the plaintiff’s qualifications, hired someone substantially younger, or he was
rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.197
that GINA explicitly excludes actions based on a disparate impact theory; and that ADEA does not
have a disparate impact clause in the statute, but has been interpreted to include one. Ifeoma Ajunwa,
Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75, 93–96 (2016). “To state a prima
facie case for disparate impact under the ADEA, a plaintiff must (1) identify a specific, facially neutral
policy, and (2) proffer statistical evidence that the policy caused a significant age-based disparity.”
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 2017). The burden of persuasion then
shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged policy or practice was based on a reasonable factor
other than age. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008). But courts have held
that job applicants may not bring disparate impact claims under ADEA. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp.,
914 F.3d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 306 (2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). Even when a
disparate impact theory is available, such cases are a small percentage of discrimination cases. In a
study of cases filed in federal courts from 1988 to 2003, only about four percent of cases were brought
a disparate impact theory. BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 58.
195. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009). The Supreme Court in Babb
v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1171 (2020), has articulated a different causation standard under the federalsector provision of the ADEA, holding that personnel actions must “be untainted by any consideration
of age.” However, relief will be limited unless plaintiff can meet the “but-for” test. Babb, 140 S. Ct.
at 1176.
196. E.g., Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc., 779 F.3d 19, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2015)
(finding direct evidence in comments by head of human resources that plaintiff was “too old” for the
job).
197. A prima facie disparate treatment case might be articulated in various ways, depending on
the case. See, e.g., Oliver v. Joint Logistics Managers, Inc., 893 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2018) (“To
make out a prima facie case of discrimination in the failure-to-hire context, a plaintiff must establish
that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for and applied to an open position;
(3) he was rejected; and (4) the employer filled the position by hiring someone outside the protected
class, or left the position open.”); Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 544–45 (4th
Cir. 2003) (using framework in failure-to-hire case where plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member
of a protected group; (2) he applied for the position in question; (3) he was qualified for the position;
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If the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the articulated reason is pretextual. 198 Evidence
a court might consider here includes: plaintiff’s superior qualifications,
compared to the substantially younger person who actually was hired;199
discriminatory treatment against other older workers;200 statistics showing age
disparities in the employer’s workforce;201 discriminatory comments;202
wording of job postings that might suggest a preference for younger
employees;203 an employer’s changing rationales, inconsistent application of
policies, or shifting job criteria;204 or other evidence that might give rise to an
inference of discrimination.205
and (4) he was rejected for the position under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.).
198. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Some evidence might do
“double duty” in the sense that “evidence adduced in the process of presenting a prima facie case may
serve the purpose of showing pretext.” LARSON, supra note 168, at 135–57.
199. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 7 (4th ed. 2021) (“[A] way in which
plaintiffs seek to establish the pretextual nature of the defendant’s explanation is by offering evidence
that they are more qualified than the candidate that received the employment opportunity that was
denied to the plaintiff.”).
200. See Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 24, 33–34 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1021 (1999) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court admitted testimony concerning
treatment of other older workers); LARSON, supra note 169, at 135–63 (“[E]vidence of discrimination
against other employees by supervisors not involved in the action against the plaintiff may, in certain
circumstances, be relevant to show the employer’s discriminatory animus.”).
201. See MACK A. PLAYER & SANDRA F. SPERINO, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 109 (9th ed. 2021) (“Statistical data showing an unbalanced work force or rejection
of a disproportionate percentage of [those in plaintiff’s protected class] may suggest a general
discriminatory animus.”); LARSON, supra note 168, at 136–62 (“Plaintiffs have attempted to show
pretext by offering statistical evidence, sometimes successfully, and sometimes not.”) (footnotes
omitted) (citing cases).
202. Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[C]omments may
be circumstantial evidence of discrimination if they reflect discriminatory animus and are uttered by a
person who wields influence over the challenged employment action.”); LARSON, supra note 168, at
135–64 (citing cases).
203. The wording of job postings and advertisements can suggest unlawful discrimination. 29
C.F.R. § 1625.4 (2007).
204. See, e.g., Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Sch., 953 F.3d 923, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2020) (considering
“fluctuating accounts” and “shifting criteria” in selection process). PLAYER & SPERINO, supra note
201, at 109–10 (“Pretext can be established by showing that the [defendant’s] articulated reason has
not been consistently applied in the past. . . . Articulation of a reason different from that given at the
time of the [employment decision at issue] is also strong evidence that the articulated reason was an
afterthought, a pretext to cover illegal motivation.”).
205. Evidence that might support a finding of pretext, depending on the circumstances, might
also include the employer’s failure to follow its own guidelines, notation of age information, rejection
of an applicant on sight. LARSON, supra note 168, at 135–69, 135–72 to –73 (citing cases). Other
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Alex will need enough such evidence (“bits and pieces”206) if his claim for
age discrimination will get any traction. How can he do that? He does not
know who was hired, their ages, or their qualifications. There is no language
in the job postings or application forms to suggest age discrimination (for
example, a preference for recent graduates).207
He did notice when he went for his job interview that just about everyone
there was in their twenties or thirties, but he does not have any specific
information about them. Counsel might be better able to search legal databases
for other litigation (not arbitration), reports of discrimination, or other publicly
available data that might provide some useful information or leads. Maybe
Alex hears through his networks that some employers are not hiring older
workers, or he reads about discrimination claims against high-tech employers
or surveys suggesting more age bias in the industry.208
He has also read about employers increasingly using data automateddecision systems (ADS),209 such as machine learning processes where
algorithms are used in recruitment and hiring.
factors to suggest pretext might include an employer’s failure to interview the rejected job candidate,
Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 351 (6th Cir. 1997), and subjective hiring criteria, which
might be used to mask or camouflage a discriminatory motive, Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344,
1356 (D.C. Cir. 2012). See also Marnocha v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d
711, 721 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions”
in the employer’s asserted reasons can be evidence of pretext).
206. See discussion supra § V.A.
207. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SYSTEMIC ENFORCEMENT AT THE EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/systemic-enforcement-eeoc [https://perma.cc/6GC5-TLPR] (citing examples of
practices that may involve systemic discrimination, including job ads using words such as “young,”
“energetic,” “recent graduate.”).
208. See, e.g., C.W. Headley, The industries least likely to hire workers over age 45 and the
reasons why, THE LADDERS (Aug. 27, 2020) https://www.theladders.com/career-advice/theindustries-least-likely-to-hire-workers-over-age-45-and-the-reasons-why
[https://perma.cc/5E63WA4Q] (discussing age-based stereotypes and identifying industries, including software and IT, most
reluctant to hire older workers).
209. Hearing on the Future of Work: Protecting Workers’ Civil Rights in the Digital Age:, (Feb.
5,
2020)
(testimony
of
Ifeoma
Ajunwa),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/ED/ED07/20200205/110438/HHRG-116-ED07-WstateAjunwaJDPhDI-20200205.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV32-XLAH] [hereinafter Ajunwa Testimony]
(“According to a survey by Paychex in 2019, 72% of US Human Resource (HR) leaders reported that
recruiting technology enabled them to reach high-quality candidates and 45% of them plan to increase
financial investment in these technologies. Another survey conducted by Korn Ferry found that over
69% of recruiters surveyed asserted that automated hiring platforms enabled them to find more
qualified candidates.”) (footnotes omitted). Some of these methods are getting more media attention
lately. E.g., Julie Weed, Résumé-Writing Tips to Help You Get Past the A.I. Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
19,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/business/resume-filter-articialintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/B4VM-64E7] (“[H]uman resources departments are increasingly
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ADS starts with data. Employers, often with the help of a vendor, can now
collect and analyze large quantities of personal and consumer information from
a variety of sources to create profiles or dossiers of job applicants.210 The data
can be collected from the “digital footprints” we leave behind when we use
social media, smart phones, fitness apps, navigation tools, when we use credit
cards and store loyalty cards, and just about any time we use the internet. Such
massive data can be scooped up and combined with public records (e.g.,
marriage and divorce records, property transfers, litigation) that are now more
likely to be digitized and readily available.211 Employers can now “mix and
match” or customize the buffet of offerings by data vendors, which can then be
used to sort, rank, and score job candidates.212
turning to artificial intelligence systems to pluck out the candidates deemed to be good fits.”). A good
working definition of “automated decision systems” is the following modification of the definition in
the proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019): An automated decision system (ADS) is a
“computational process, including one derived from machine learning, statistics, or other data
processing or artificial intelligence techniques, that makes a decision or facilitates human decision
making . . . ” that affects employees or job seekers. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R.
2231, 116th Congress §2 (2019). Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 VA. L. REV. 867,
871 (2020). Predictive analytical tools in the employment context are also known as workforce
analytics, people analytics, or talent analytics. People Analytics, CORNERSTONE (Aug. 30, 2021),
https://www.cornerstoneondemand.com/glossary/people-analytics/ [https://perma.cc/E4V8-VSN7].
210. Trindel Testimony, supra note 135.
211. Id.
212. As the EEOC heard at a 2016 meeting about the sources and uses of “big data” in the
workplace, businesses can now combine their own in-house data with “public records, social media
activity logs, sensors, geographic systems, internet browsing history, consumer data-tracking systems,
mobile devices, and communications metadata systems. . . . [E]verything is data. Everything that we
do and say can be coded, quantified and utilized for analytic purposes.” Id. See also Miranda Bogen
& Aaron Rieke, Help Wanted: An Examination of Hiring Algorithms, Equity, and Bias, UPTURN (Dec.
2018),
https://www.upturn.org/reports/2018/hiring-algorithms/
[https://perma.cc/HP8D-3K3S]
(“[E]mployers can use multiple recruitment tools, often from third party vendors, to manage their
hiring activities. Many of these tools can integrate with each other, making it easy for employers to
mix and match product behind the scenes.”) (footnote omitted); Michal Kosinski, Assistant Professor
Organizational Behavior Stanford Graduate School of Business, Big Data in the Workplace:
Examining Implications for Equal Employment Opportunity Law, Testimony at the Meeting of the
EEOC (Oct. 13, 2016) https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/meeting-october-13-2016-big-data-workplaceexamining-implications-equal-employment/kosinski
[https://perma.cc/DG7L-KAX6];
Trindell
Testimony, supra note 135 (testifying as to type and quantity of data available for use by employers);
CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 151 (2016) (“Scores of companies, from giants
like Acxiom Corporation to a host of fly-by-night operations, buy information from retailers,
advertisers, smartphone app makers, and companies that run sweepstakes or operate social networks
in order to assemble a cornucopia of facts on every consumer in the country. They might note, for
example, whether a consumer has diabetes, lives in a house with a smoker, drives an SUV, or owns a
pair of collies (who may live on in the dossier long after their earthly departure). These companies
also scrape all kinds of publicly available government data, including voting and arrest records and
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A 2016 White House report notes various ways that such methods might
discriminate. For example:
[M]achine-learning algorithms can help determine what kinds of employees
are likely to be successful by reviewing the past performance of existing
employees or by analyzing the preferences of hiring managers as shown by
their past decisions. But if those sources themselves contain historical
biases, the scores may well replicate those same biases.213
While some argue that ADS is less biased than humans, others counter that
ADS can discriminate in ways that are less visible, less traceable, with a veneer
of mathematical legitimacy.214 As two commentators put it: “In the Wild West
of datafied employment, transparency is . . . rare. Most workers have scarcely
an inkling that their data is being mined and exploited” by employers.215 So,
housing sales. All of this goes into a consumer profile, which they sell.”). Citron and Pasquale refer
to the “‘big data’s’ promiscuous mashup of various data sources to deny opportunities.” Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 32–33 (2014). ADS can be used to recruit active job seekers and seek out passive job
candidates, in which case Alex might never even see a job posting. The scenario where one does not
see a job posting and so does not apply presents additional challenges for proving discrimination, as
discussed in Pauline T. Kim & Sharion Scott, Discrimination in Online Employment Recruiting, 63
ST. LOUIS L.J. 93 (2018).
213. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS,
OPPORTUNITY,
AND
CIVIL
RIGHTS
13–15
(May
2016)
(footnote
omitted),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_data_discrimina
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XRP-6MH6]. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 136, at 92, also discusses the
“pernicious feedback loop that can amplify discrimination over time.”
214. See Anjanette H. Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford, Building
a Better HAL 9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias, 15 NW.
J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 215, 232 (2018) (“Invoking words like ‘data’ and ‘algorithm’ can provide a
veneer of objectivity and social science that prevents the critical discussion and iterative improvement
necessary to actually use them wisely.”); Bogen & Rieke, supra note 212, at 47 (“Legal scholars have
aptly noted that ‘although algorithms offer the potential for avoiding or minimizing bias, the real
question is how the biases they may introduce compare with the human biases they avoid.’ Our
research did not convince us that sufficient safeguards yet exist to ensure this balance will tip in favor
of equity.”) (footnote omitted). Others have discussed in far more technical detail the various ways
that ADS might result in discrimination, and the difficulties of proving such discrimination. E.g.,
Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671
(2020); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017);
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016).
215. Adler-Bell & Miller, supra note 135, at 3. In a study of technologies used to hire low-wage
workers, researchers:
[W]ere not able to see how each employer ultimately analyzed the data it gathered from job
seekers. . . . [N]either applicants nor researchers have any way of knowing how employers are
making decisions behind the scenes. . . . Employers rarely inform applicants about the purpose
of selection procedures, their performance on pre-employment tests, or reasons why their
application was rejected.
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while it has always been difficult to prove discrimination in hiring, we now
have the additional complexity and opacity of ADS, often characterized as a
“black box.” 216 And proving discrimination in this scenario will likely require
expert testimony and a sophisticated litigation team, which can be prohibitively
expensive for an unemployed lone-plaintiff.217 Unsurprisingly, there has been
little litigation challenging such selection tools.218
At this point, Alex is in the dark about why he did not get hired. And unless
an attorney believes further investigation might yield some evidence, the firm
will likely not take on the matter. Like Emma, Alex might go to the EEOC,
and will likely run into similar obstacles.219

Rieke, Janardan, Hsu & Duarte, Essential Work, supra note 189, at 28, 43. There has been movement
on the state level to regulate some of these practices. E.g., Illinois’ Artificial Intelligence Video
Interview Act requires, inter alia, that employers notify job candidates when artificial intelligence is
used in video interviewing, provide an explanation of how the AI system works, and obtain the
applicant’s consent before the video interview. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 42 (2019).
216. See, e.g., MANISH RAGHAVAN & SOLON BAROCAS, Challenges for Mitigating Bias in
Algorithmic Hiring, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec 6, 2019) https://www.brookings.edu/research/challengesfor-mitigating-bias-in-algorithmic-hiring/ [https://perma.cc/F7ZW-ZY9M] (“[T]these algorithms (and
the datasets used to build them) are typically proprietary and contain private, sensitive employee
data. . . . [T]he industry rarely discloses details about its methods or the mechanisms by which it aims
to achieve an unbiased assessment.”); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 706 (2017) (“Almost all
legal scholarship references machine learning as a ‘black box,’ and many authors state something like,
‘Even the programmers of an algorithm do not know how it makes its predictions.’”) (footnotes
omitted); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 21, 35 (2015) (describing the fair, foul and
creepy uses of data and ADS, which can be used “secretly to rank, rate, and evaluate persons, often to
their detriment and often unfairly.”).
217. See Bogen & Rieke, supra note 212, at 12 (“[M]any job[-]seekers may not realize they have
been judged by a predictive technology, and even if they do, may not have sufficient access to the tool
to describe its impact (or the resources to retain expert witnesses to do so) . . . .”); Citron & Pasquale,
supra note 212, at 33 (“Opening up the black box scoring systems to individuals or neutral experts
representing them is key to permitting them to challenge ‘arbitrariness by algorithm.’”).
218. The Future of Work: Protecting Workers’ Civil Rights in the Digital Age, 18 (Feb. 5, 2020)
(testimony
of
Peter
Romer-Friedman),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/ED/ED07/20200205/110438/HHRG-116-ED07-Wstate-RomerFriedmanJDP-20200205.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZZ4-P7ZT] [hereinafter Romer-Friedman testimony]
(“Despite the large number of employers that have already engaged in digital discrimination, there
have been very few lawsuits or legal actions filed—because most workers do not know what
technologies employers have used to advertise, recruit, hire, fire, promote, or set compensation.”).
219. Unlike a Title VII complainant, an ADEA complainant need not obtain a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC before filing in court. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, FILING A LAWSUIT,
https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/WL6S-ZNAE].
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VI. RECENT TRANSPARENCY PROPOSALS
Noteworthy workplace transparency proposals (broadly defined), with
varied aims and approaches, have mushroomed in recent years.
Some propose that data that is already reported to government agencies be
more widely available. Berrey, Nelson, and Nielson note, for example, that
making EEO-1 data public “would allow potential plaintiffs and their attorneys
an opportunity to assess the likelihood that illegal discrimination is playing a
role in the reward structures of employers.”220 Estlund points out that
employers already gather and disclose some such data to government
agencies.221 She suggests “piggybacking on existing reporting requirements,”
making public more of what government already collects or what employers
already gather.222
There are calls for government to collect more data about workplace
demographics as well as earnings.223
In addition to EEO-1 and other reports (discussed above), covered
employers were briefly required (for years 2017–2018) to prepare EEO-1
“Component 2” reports, to include employee aggregated pay data, broken down
by gender, race, ethnicity, and job category.224 Collection of pay data for those
years was deemed complete (after a court battle), and the EEOC stated that does
not intend to collect such pay data in the future.225 Rather, the EEOC
announced in July 2020 that it was funding a study to review the quality and
utility of such data.226 Some have called for the EEOC to reinstate the

220. BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 271.
221. Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 11, at 396.
222. Id. at 396–97. Estlund writes that pay information, for example, reported only to
government agencies “would not help employees themselves to detect pay discrimination.” Estlund,
Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency, supra note 11, at 786.
223. Berrey, Nelson, and Nielsen, also propose that the EEOC make more information available
to employees about their employer’s demographic composition and pay data, including earnings by
race/ethnicity and gender, information beyond what is currently collected as part of EEO-1 reports.
BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 80, at 272.
224. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT EEOC’S
PROPOSAL TO COLLECT PAY DATA, 2–3, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-abouteeocs-proposal-collect-pay-data [https://perma.cc/3R9C-BWK2].
225. Agency Information Collection, 85 Fed. Reg. 16340, 16341 (proposed Mar. 23, 2020).
226. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Announces Analysis of EEO-1 Component
2 Pay Data Collection (July 16, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-announces-analysiseeo-1-component-2-pay-data-collection [https://perma.cc/PE9F-FAE5]. Bornstein details Component
2 reporting, and the litigation challenging the mandate. Bornstein, supra note 58, at 323–27.
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Component 2 data collection.227 In the meantime, some states have imposed
pay data collection. California, for example, has enacted a statute that requires
covered employers to collect and report the type of pay data required by the
EEOC’s now-mothballed Component 2 form.228 Illinois passed legislation in
2021 that will require covered employers to provide EEO-1 data to the state,
which will then make the reports available to the public.229
Some scholars have promoted other measures to require or encourage
employers to disclose their pay data.230 Gowri Ramachandran, for example,
proposes a pay transparency defense to, or safe harbor from, claims of pay
discrimination, if the employer can establish that it made salaries internally
transparent, in an “easily accessible” form, and the plaintiff-employee “failed
to voice objections to any suspected or alleged discrimination in a timely
fashion.”231 Marianne DelPo Kulow proposes a mandatory wage disclosure
requirement based on current public-employment disclosure rules.232 Under her
proposal, employers would be required to post annual pay data for each
employee, with information about gender, age, and length of service.233 The
postings would be available to all employees and to government agencies. 234
Orly Lobel proposes that we “incentivize employers to self-assess, monitor, and
actively take steps to close the pay gap.”235 Bradley Areheart suggests
legislating economic incentives, such as tax inducements for employers that
make pay data publicly available.236
Some are looking to experiences in other countries that require pay
disclosures of various types. Iceland, for example, requires that employers with
227. E.g., Jocelyn Frye, Why Pay Data Matter in the Fight for Equal Pay, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS
(Mar.
2,
2020),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2020/03/02/480920/pay-data-matter-fightequal-pay/ [https://perma.cc/Q2HS-MFRS].
228. Government Code Section 12999 enacted in SB 973. California Pay Data Reporting, CAL.
DEPT. OF FAIR EMP. AND HOUS., https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/paydatareporting/ [https://perma.cc/NF45ZXU6]. Bornstein, supra note 58, at 321–22 (discussing the California law, and a measure being
considered in New York).
229. Act of Mar. 23, 2021, Pub. Act 101-0656, 2021 Ill. Laws.
230. Alexander, supra note 169, at 181 n.15 (citing to numerous scholars who have “championed
pay transparency rules, which would force employers to publicize their wage and salary schedules and
prohibit bans on workers’ discussions of pay”).
231. Ramachandran, supra note 148, at 1073–74, 1077.
232. Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage Disclosure
Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV. J. ON LEG. 385, 428
(2013).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Lobel, Knowledge Pays, supra note 56, at 600–01.
236. Areheart, supra note 74, at 1983.
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at least twenty-five employees to do a pay audit and certify that their
compensation structures comply with government standards.237 And the
European Commission in March 2021 put forward a proposal that requires
covered employers, inter alia: to give job applicants the right to information
about their expected pay level, either in a job posting or prior the interview,
without the applicant having to request it; make “easily accessible to its workers
a description of the criteria used to determine pay levels and career progression
for workers”; give workers the right to information upon request on “their
individual pay level and the average pay levels, broken down by sex, for
categories of workers doing the same work as them or work of equal value to
theirs”; and report data on gender pay gaps to workers and their representatives,
and make it publicly available.238 It would also ban pay secrecy rules.239
The Paycheck Fairness Act was reintroduced to Congress in January
2021.240 It would require more collection by the EEOC and OFCCP of
compensation and other employment data according to the sex, race, and
national origin, with aggregated data made publicly available.241 It would
permit class actions under the EPA, limit defenses to the EPA, provide greater
remedies, and increase penalties for violations.242 In addition, it would prohibit
pay secrecy agreements and waivers, prohibit the use of prior salary in making
hiring decisions, and enhance nonretaliation prohibitions to include retaliation
for discussing pay.243 It does not address the issue of MAAs or the use of NDAs
in settlements of claims under the EPA.244
As discussed above, some states have recently passed anti-pay secrecy
statutes, under which employers may not prohibit employees from talking with
their coworkers about their compensation. Other states are considering similar
measures of various types.245
237. Bornstein, supra note 58, at 316–17 (discussing Iceland’s mandate); Lobel, Knowledge
Pays, supra note 56, at 603–04 (discussing Iceland and other countries).
238. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (Mar. 4, 2021)
2021/0050,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0093
[https://perma.cc/DB56-8RSW].
239. Id.
240. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 117th Cong. (2021). Text of current version, history, and
earlier versions available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/117/hr7 [https://perma.cc/7GDGBK4Z].
241. Id. § 7.
242. Id. § 2.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See discussion supra § III.B. Tatiana Follett & Iris Hentze, The Gender Pay Gap, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
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Some suggest requiring audits to detect discrimination in the use of ADS,
with audits done by, disclosed to, or available to government agencies.246
Others have voiced concerns with a reliance on auditing, a nascent field with a
lack of standards or oversight.247 Auditors, themselves, have reported being
kept in the dark, relating situations where they were not given access to the
necessary software code.248 Many have noted the technical complexities of
such auditing, how to “explain” what is inside the black box, the difficulties of
developing standards and guidelines, and the reluctance of companies to open
their algorithmic machinery to scrutiny.249
There have been several bills offered on the federal, state, and municipal
levels to address the potential discriminatory effects of ADS, not necessarily

employment/the-gender-pay-gap.aspx [https://perma.cc/C2BT-GP34] (reviewing research on gender
pay gap and state efforts to address it).
246. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring, 34 HARV. J.L. &
TECH., 621, 663–64, 667 (2021) (proposing mandatory auditing of hiring practices that use
algorithms); Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 189, 202
(2017) (“Auditing is an essential strategy for detecting unintended bias and prompting the
reexamination and revision of algorithms to reduce discriminatory effects.”); Danielle Keats Citron,
Big Data Should Be Regulated by ‘Technological Due Process’, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/06/is-big-data-spreading-inequality/big-datashould-be-regulated-by-technological-due-process [https://perma.cc/GHC4-WGCK] (“The best way
to ensure the fairness of scoring systems is through routine auditing by an expert agency.”).
247. See Alfred Ng, Can Auditing Eliminate Bias from Algorithms?, THE MARKUP (Feb. 23,
2021),
https://themarkup.org/ask-the-markup/2021/02/23/can-auditing-eliminate-bias-fromalgorithms [https://perma.cc/5L5L-SGLP] (describing algorithmic auditing as “a pretty undefined
field,” where “there are no industry standards or regulations that hold the auditors or the companies
that use them to account.”).
248. Id. (“[B]ecause audit reports are also almost always bound by non-disclosure agreements,
the companies can’t compare each other’s work. . . . Auditors have been in scenarios where they don’t
have access to the software’s code and so risk violating computer access laws . . . .”). See also Ryan
Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 430 (2017)
(“Many AI systems in use or development today are proprietary, and owners of AI systems have
inadequate incentives to open them up to scrutiny.”).
249. E.g., Christo Wilson, Avijit Ghosh, Shan Jiang, Alan Mislove, Lewis Baker, Janelle Szary,
Kelly Trindel & Frida Polli, Building and Auditing Fair Algorithms: A Case Study in Candidate
Screening, FACCT (Mar. 2021), https://cbw.sh/static/pdf/wilson-facct21.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPN8HDPJ] (“Academics, activists, and regulators are increasingly urging companies to develop and deploy
sociotechnical systems that are fair and unbiased. Achieving this goal, however, is complex . . . . To
date, there are few examples of companies that have transparently undertaken [necessary] steps.”); Ng,
supra note 247 (“[A]ccording to multiple auditors, companies don’t want the scrutiny or potential legal
issues that [] scrutiny may raise . . . .”); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2018) (“Scholarly and policy debates about
regulating a world controlled by algorithms have been mired in difficult questions about how to
observe, access, audit, or understand those algorithms.”).
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limited to the workplace.250 Some have been drafted with a focus on requiring
companies that use ADS to evaluate their own systems.251 The proposed federal
Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 would have required specified
commercial entities to conduct assessments of high-risk systems that involve
personal information or make automated decisions.252 The companies required
to make such assessments would decide whether to publicize them.253 The
proposed federal Algorithmic Fairness Act of 2020 would have required
covered entities to create an audit trail (to be made available to the Fair Trade
Commission upon request), to notify consumers when they had been the subject
of an algorithmic determination, and to give them an opportunity to correct data
used in the determination.254
Proposed state legislation in Washington would establish guidelines for
government procurement and the use of automated decision systems. The bill
would also add a provision to the state’s anti-discrimination statute, making it
“an unfair practice for any automated decision system to discriminate” on the
basis of a factor enumerated in the discrimination statute.255
Some have proposed that employers notify workers and disclose to
government agencies the types of ADS they use to make employment
decisions.256
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, a coalition of more
than 200 national civil rights organizations, has issued a set of principles to
250. See Legislation Related to Artificial Intelligence, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2020-legislationrelated-to-artificial-intelligence.aspx [https://perma.cc/N3NG-H6XH] (tracking developments).
251. Id. at 2.
252. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019). Text and
Legislative History can be found at https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr2231/BILLS116hr2231ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5G2-RMWC].
253. Id. § 3.
254. Algorithmic Fairness Act of 2020, S. 5052, 116th Cong. § 5 (2020). Text and Legislative
History can be found at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/5052/text
[https://perma.cc/CNA3-RPTG].
255. S. 5116, 67th Leg., 2021 Session (Wash. 2021); see Lydia X. Z. Brown, 2021 State
Legislative Sessions Off to a Slow Start on AI Oversight, Offer 3 Models for Auditing, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 15, 2021) for a discussion of state legislative efforts to address
accountability and transparency in government use of ADS.
256. See, e.g., Romer-Friedman Testimony, supra note 218 (proposing that employers and
digital platforms be required to publicly disclose information about job advertisements, demographics
and geographical reach of people targeted; and that employers disclose uses, workings, effects of ADS
to jobseekers, employees, and government regulators); Hirsch, Future Work, supra note 136, at 943–
44 (“[P]rocedural protections would better ensure fair and accurate analyses, such as requiring
employers to notify workers of the use of AI and providing workers the opportunity [to] correct any
erroneous data.”).
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guide the use of hiring assessment technologies. Its recommendations include
“meaningful” notification to job applicants about the use of hiring technologies
and “reasonable and timely feedback” to applicants about their performance on
a hiring assessment; regular audit of assessment tools and public disclosure of
the methods and results of such audits; regulatory oversight that includes the
authority to request information from organizations about the development and
use of hiring assessments.257
A recent New York City proposal would require companies using
automated employment-decision tools to disclose use of the technology.258
Vendors of such software would be required to conduct a “bias audit” of their
products each year and make the results available to job candidates and
employees.259 The bill would also require any person who uses automated
employment assessment tools for hiring and other employment purposes to
disclose to candidates, within thirty days, when such tools were used to assess
their candidacy for employment, and the job qualifications or characteristics for
which the tool was used to screen.260
Some commentators have supported empowering the EEOC to take a
greater role in addressing the uses of ADS in the workplace.261 Former EEOC
Chair Jenny Yang, for example, has written that the “EEOC could be
empowered to establish standards for [ADS] auditors.”262
As discussed above, there has been something of a movement to limit
NDAs.263 Several states have now enacted restrictions on NDAs, although such
measures vary widely. Some are under consideration.264 Some have proposed
257. CIVIL RIGHTS PRINCIPLES FOR HIRING ASSESSMENT TECHNOLOGIES, THE LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS (July 2020), https://civilrights.org/resource/civil-rightsprinciples-for-hiring-assessment-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/EKZ2-8FKR].
258. New
York,
N.Y.,
City
Council
Int.
1894–2020
(2020),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4344524&GUID=B051915D-A9AC451E-81F8-6596032FA3F9&Options=Advanced&Search [https://perma.cc/4ZTJ-DMDQ].
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. E.g., Rieke, Janardan, Hsu & Duarte, supra note 189, at 41–42 (urging the EEOC “to
increase its use of Commissioner charges and directed investigations” and “encourag[ing] the EEOC
to creatively and aggressively use its statutory research authority to help develop a more detailed
picture of how large employers are using hiring technologies today. Longer term, Congress may need
to grant the EEOC new powers to ensure that it can provide effective oversight.”) (footnote omitted).
262. Yang Testimony, supra note 135.
263. See discussion supra § III.B.
264. Bornstein, supra note 58, at 342 (“A number of legal scholars have also proposed, and
federal legislators have introduced, bills that would limit or bar nondisclosure agreements or
confidential settlements that include sexual harassment claims or discrimination claims on the basis of
any protected class.”) (footnote omitted); Johnson, Sekaran, and Gombar, supra note 54 (tracking
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alternatives to legislation, such as greater agency oversight and approval of
settlements, and treating NDAs in cases of sexual misconduct as void against
public policy.265
The Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, introduced in the House in
February 2021, would invalidate all MAAs as to consumer, employment,
antitrust, and civil rights disputes.266 Protecting the Right to Organize Act of
2021, would bar class action waivers in arbitration agreements.267 There have
also been numerous attempts at the state level to curb the use of MAAs in the
workplace, which have largely faltered on preemption grounds.268
Jane Flanagan and Terri Gerstein suggest a multi-prong approach to
addressing problems with MAAs and other coercive contracts. They would
require that arbitrators make regular disclosures about arbitrations they handle
and that workplace arbitration complaints and results be provided to state
attorneys general, “to create a record of cases and also to allow the state to step
in and address patterns and practices of violations that may be obscured by
arbitration’s lack of transparency.”269 They would also require that employers
give advance notice to workers—before they accept the position—any
contractual terms that come with the job, and direct government agencies to
collect data and issue reports on employment contracts to monitor “practices
that may be curtailing workers’ rights and mobility, and serve as the basis for
future legislative proposals. At the very least, labor enforcement agencies
should routinely ask for and collect copies of employment contracts when they
are conducting wage and hour, discrimination, or other investigations of
workplace violations.”270

developments on state level); Ifeoma Ozoma, An NDA Was Designed to Keep Me Quiet, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/opinion/nda-work-discrimination.html
[https://perma.cc/5CGZ-C2F6] (supporting California bill to allow discrimination victims to speak,
regardless of NDA or non-disparagement agreements).
265. See Bornstein, supra note 58, at 343–45 (outlining some of these proposals).
266. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 963, 117th Cong. (2021).
267. The PRO Act, is a broader reform measure that would also amend the NLRA to allow
workers to bring a private right of action, require that employers post notice of rights under NLRA,
expand the definition of “supervisor,” and broaden the definition of joint employment). Protecting the
Right to Organize Act of 2021, H.R. 842, 117th Cong. (2021).
268. See Johnson, Sekaran & Gombar, supra note 53; Juvan Bonni, Jonathan Ence, Lauren Smith
& Jackson Tyler, State Legislative Update, 2020 J. DISP. RESOL. 221, 227–34 (tracking developments
regarding state efforts, and the challenges to same).
269. Jane Flanagan & Terri Gerstein, “Sign on the Dotted Line”: How Coercive Employment
Contracts Are Bringing Back the Lochner Era and What We Can Do About It, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 441,
469 (2020) (enumerating state efforts to curb MAAs).
270. Id. at 470–71.

BERNT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

WORKPLACE TRANSPARENCY BEYOND DISCLOSURE

127

On another front, Suzette Malveaux proposes “plausibility discovery,” that
is, “limited, targeted discovery made available to the parties at the pleading
stage in response to a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the
grounds that a plaintiffs claims are implausible.”271 Malveaux suggests that
such early discovery would be appropriate “where there is informational
asymmetry between the parties.”272
VII. LOOKING AT TRANSPARENCY PROPOSALS FROM THE WORKER’S SEAT
Rather than offer a critique of each of these numerous, varied proposals, I
suggest that as a starting point, we pay greater attention to the sightlines of those
workers who cannot get information they need to spot, articulate, and prove
violations of workplace protections.
Development and assessment of transparency proposals should consider (at
least) the following questions: Is the (or a) goal to aid workers in recognizing
and stating a violation of a substantive mandate (such as the discrimination laws
or the EPA)?273 If so:
• What does the worker need to know to recognize a
potential claim under the particular substantive mandate?
To assess the viability of a claim? To state a claim?
• How can a worker access that information? Is it timely?
Is it comprehensible? Is the information readily available
to employees and applicants? To the public? Or must the
worker make a request for it from the employer? If the
latter, how will signaling and retaliation concerns be
addressed?
• If the information is not comprehensible by most workers,
is there a space and opportunity for an intermediary (e.g.,
a worker center) to collect, distribute, and interpret
relevant data?
• How visible and useful is the measure for those without
affordable access to legal assistance?
• Will aggrieved workers be able to act collectively?
• Will confidentiality requirements, secrecy constraints, or
employee monitoring limit or negate the benefits of the

271. Malveaux, supra note 185, at 630.
272. Id.; Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65,
108 (2010) (discussing how early discovery might work; authority for same; possible objections).
273. I am not suggesting this is the only worthwhile goal. Transparency measures might serve
other purposes, for example along Estlund’s other dimensions, “in aid of contract” or “in aid of
reputational rewards and sanctions.” Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 11, at 369.
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transparency proposal?
• Are there procedural impediments that need to be
addressed?
• What additional measures might be necessary to address
the concerns raised here?
To illustrate, assume passage of the Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA).274 The
PFA would require that employers provide compensation data (by sex, race,
and national origin) to the EEOC (and if a covered federal contractor, the
OFCCP), and aggregated data would be publicly available.275 That might help
workers understand pay practices by industry, but Emma would not be able to
see specific data about her own employer. The PFA would prohibit employers
from requiring pay secrecy as a condition of employment.276 But how free will
workers be to discuss pay if every move and breath they take is being
monitored? The PFA would limit defenses to the EPA and provide greater
remedies for violations.277 But if Emma and coworkers are bound by NDAs,
how will Emma learn whether others at her job have complained of similar
violations? If they are bound by MAAs, how will Emma learn about other
claims that might have gone to arbitration? How likely will she be to find
counsel willing to take the matter to arbitration? The PFA removes barriers to
class actions under the EPA,278 but what if the MAA at Emma’s workplace
prohibits class or collective actions? So, while PFA might be a significant
improvement to pay equity protections, it alone will not remove some important
impediments to accessing information necessary to recognize and bring a claim.
Consider Alex’s situation and the proposed New York City law on the sale
of automated decision tools.279 That law would require ADS vendors to audit
their tools for bias.280 It would also require that employers using ADS to hire
(and for other employment purposes) to disclose to candidates within thirty
days when such tools were used to assess their job candidacy.281 Suppose Alex,
who suspects age discrimination, finds out within the thirty days that a
prospective employer uses an automated decision tool. Then what? Can he see
the data? Does he know what to do with the information? How would he know
274. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 117th Cong. (2021). Text of current version, history, and
earlier versions available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/117/hr7 [https://perma.cc/2HHQSP4Y].
275. Id. § 7.
276. Id. § 2.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. New York, N.Y., City Council Int. 1894–2020 (2020).
280. Id.
281. Id.
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if there was unlawful discrimination in the process? And how can he prove it?
Must he do this as a lone-plaintiff, for example, if he is bound by an MAA with
a class-action waiver? Can he afford to do so? Will he be able to learn of others
who have breached the black box? Or have they been decided in private
arbitration or resolved by way of a settlement that includes an NDA?
VIII. CONCLUSION
There has long been informational asymmetry between employers and
workers. Now consider the many new ways to intensively monitor workers,
the growing use of NDAs and other gag rules, MAAs, and the shrouded uses of
technologies to hire and make other employment decisions. At the same time,
contemporary work relationships and employment practices have left workers
more isolated and less able to act collectively. The result is that workers are
more in the dark than ever when it comes to much of an employer’s decisionmaking.
Discussions of workplace transparency need to acknowledge and address
these realities of today’s workplace. My point here is not to endorse any
particular disclosure scheme. Rather, I suggest that any proposals consider the
view from the worker’s perch. Transparency proposals need to consider not
only disclosure mandates, but obstacles to a worker’s sightline, and chokepoints
to information flow.
Effective measures will need to be multi-pronged to address the problems
outlined here, with some combination of disclosures, removal of barriers, and
consideration of the person or entities doing the viewing. Otherwise, we will
continue to put the burden of enforcement on workers, leaving them without
the means to do so.

